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ABSTRACT 
 
GINA FLAKES:  Integration & Exchange Rate Theory: 
Empirically Evaluating the Predictability of Individual Preferences 
(Under the Direction of Thomas Oatley) 
 
 
 
This dissertation comprises three articles that collectively speak to the predictability, 
or pliability, rather, of individual preferences.  Likewise it highlights the liabilities that are 
assumed when, for simplicity’s sake, scholars make the assumption that individual 
preferences are either endogenously or exogenously given.  Using a dataset with observations 
spanning from 1973 to 2011, article one empirically scrutinizes Ronald Inglehart’s “Silent 
Revolution Theory,”  which holds individual preferences as endogenously given, a 
constructive product of societal and generational contexts.  Consistent with the statistical 
findings of article two, individual preferences are neither solely a function of constructive or 
utility-based factors.  Finally, article three, which features rare American public opinion data 
on the exchange rate, further substantiates this work’s central theme of the perils associated 
with research that defines individual preferences as either exclusively endogenously or 
exogenously given. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ATTITUDES 1973-2011: 
An Empirical Evaluation of Inglehart’s Silent Revolution Theory 
 
 
Within the past fifty years, a strong line of Political Science scholarship has sought to 
determine the source(s) of individual support for European integration.  One of the strongest 
research traditions in this area remains Ronald Inglehart’s Silent Revolution Theory, which 
holds support as a function of socialization processes and intergenerational value shifts.  
Despite the immense influence of Inglehart’s theory, which for many years was considered 
“the” explanation of integration support, its empirical renown is not as impressive.  Indeed, 
an adequate empirical evaluation of Inglehart’s theory could not be conducted until recently, 
as its testing necessitated several decades’ worth of cross-sectional panel data (Inglehart 
1970a, 1970b, 1971a, 1971b, 1977; Inglehart, Rabier & Reif 1991; Janssen 1991).  Finally, 
we have reached a point where we have data spanning a window of time long enough to 
evaluate this theory, which lies at the core of so much of the integration scholarship that has 
been conducted.   
In this paper I use newly available data from Eurobarometer Surveys, spanning from 
1973 to 2011, and cross-sectional, logistic and ordinary least-squares regression analysis to 
test Inglehart’s theory statistically.   I use Janssen’s 1991 framework, evaluating the 
hypotheses derived from Silent Revolution Theory regarding integration attitudes at the 
micro (individual), meso (age-cohort) and macro (national) levels.  I expand the dataset
2 
 
beyond the four nations in Janssen’s study to sixteen European Union member countries over 
a period of more than thirty-five years, allowing us to produce firm conclusions about this 
theory’s explanatory power (Inglehart 1971a, 1971b, Janssen 1991).    
While our statistical tests do not confirm all of the Silent Revolution hypotheses, the 
results demonstrate solid support for Inglehart’s theory at the micro level.  Contrary to 
previous studies which have relied on an insufficient time period for analyzing this theory, 
the tests empirically substantiate Inglehart’s hypotheses positing that value orientation and 
cognitive, political mobility levels are meaningful determinants of individual integration 
attitudes.  At the macro level, cognitive, political mobility levels demonstrate the 
hypothesized aggregate impact on integration attitudes, while value orientation does not.  
Likewise, at the meso level the results are mixed.  The meso findings highlight the need for 
further investigation into the issue of whether integration attitudes are driven more so by 
generational or life-cycle effects, as the implications of each could be drastically different.   
INGLEHART’S SILENT REVOLUTION THEORY 
According to Inglehart’s Silent Revolution Theory, the peaceful and prosperous 
postwar era gave rise to an intergenerational value transformation toward postmaterial 
priorities.   One of the most significant implications of this value shift with regard to Western 
Europe was that support for European integration would increase.  Inglehart’s thesis is 
premised on the belief that individual values are an artifact of socialization processes and the 
institutional context within which one’s formative years take place (Inglehart 1971a, 1971b, 
1977, 2008).   His assumptions regarding the individual’s development of political attitudes 
and preferences, as well as intergenerational differences, ultimately had ramifications at the 
aggregate level.  I will first discuss the micro-level hypotheses, then the meso- and close the 
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section with those at the macro level.    
At the micro or individual level, integration attitudes are a product of one’s political 
value-orientation and level of cognitive, political mobility (Inglehart 1970a, 1971a, 1971b, 
1977; Janssen 1991).  In terms of value orientation, Inglehart contends that individuals can be 
classified as either materialist or postmaterialist.  Individuals with a materialist value 
orientation place a premium on issues related to economic and physical security.  In contrast, 
the priorities of postmaterialists are oriented around intellectual fulfillment and emotional 
attachments.  Thus, he argues that postmaterialists are more supportive of integration than 
materialists, as meaningful evaluation of this abstract process fulfills his or her intellectual 
curiosity and needs.  Materialists, on the other hand, are not interested in such abstract issues, 
as their attitudes and interests are vested in purely material matters (Inglehart 1971a, 1971b, 
1977).     
Postmaterialists are also expected to be more supportive of integration because of the 
purported added emotional attachment it provides at a collective level.  Inglehart argues that 
postmaterialists are likely to view the nation-state as a material-centric agent, therefore 
compelling them to attach themselves to supra-national levels of government, such as the 
European Community/Union, which are predisposed toward more postmaterial priorities.   
Hypothesis I: Postmaterialists are more likely to support European 
integration than materialists.   
 
The second facet of Inglehart’s theory at the micro level concerns one’s cognitive, 
political capacity, which facilitates the understanding of abstract concepts and processes.   
According to his Cognitive Mobilization Thesis, higher cognitive, political capacity- usually 
conceived of in terms of political awareness, involvement and communication skills- 
promotes support for integration.  He reasons that because information concerning European 
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integration and supra-national politics is at a high level of abstraction, a heightened degree of 
cognitive, political capacity is needed to process and interpret relevant political messages and 
events.  Accordingly, individuals intellectually equipped to handle abstract dynamics and 
attune to political matters are less threatened by the process of integration, and are 
consequently more likely to be supportive of it than their peers of lower cognitive, political 
endowments (Inglehart 1970a, 1977; Inglehart, Rabier & Reif 1991).  In Inglehart’s words, 
cognitively mobilized individuals “are less likely to have a parochial outlook: more 
accustomed to dealing with abstractions, they can more readily identify with, and feel 
comfortable with, remote large-scale institutions such as the European Community.”  Thus, 
even though higher education and attention levels may better enable the individual to 
perceive the potential costs of integration, these costs are offset by the cosmopolitan 
perspective and priorities that an advanced degree of cognitive mobility also cultivates 
(Inglehart 1970a, 1971b; Inglehart, Rabier & Reif 1991, Mansfield & Mutz 2008). 
Hypothesis II: Individuals with a higher Cognitive, Political Mobility level are 
more likely to be supportive of European integration than those of lower 
levels. 
 
Inglehart’s theory also expects integration support to vary according to generations or 
age-cohorts.  Because value orientations and cognitive, political mobility levels are a product 
of conditions surrounding the individual’s formative years, Inglehart expects there to be 
substantial differences between the interests and attitudes of prewar and postwar generations.  
The peaceful and prosperous conditions which characterized Western Europe provided 
improvements in the compulsory educational system as well as opportunities in higher 
education.  Coupled with technological developments which enabled the expansion of mass 
communication, individuals coming of age within the postwar era are expected to have, on 
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average, higher cognitive, political skills and be better apprised of national and transnational 
politics and events (Inglehart 1970a, 1977; Inglehart, Rabier & Reif 1991; Janssen 1991).   
In addition to the postwar climate’s impact on the development of cognitive, political 
skills, Inglehart also argued that affluent and peaceful conditions increased the likelihood that 
individuals coming of age during this time would be more postmaterialistic than prewar 
generations.   Because prewar cohorts grew up in a time when physical and economic 
security was not a certainty, these individuals’ priorities are expected to remain oriented 
around material needs and are consequently less likely to support integration.    
Another critical factor making postwar cohorts more supportive of the process is the 
fact that they were raised under European institutions.   Inglehart contends that the more 
consolidated European institutions are during one’s formative years, the more solid that 
generation’s support for integration will be.  We would therefore expect individuals coming 
of age from the late 1980s onward to be strongly supportive of integration, given the highly 
consolidated European atmosphere that surrounded their development.  Although previous 
European generations lived through monumental events like the Treaty of Rome (1957) and 
Brussels (1967), research indicates that it was not until the late 1980s that integration efforts 
became more than just an ephemeral movement among elites (Haas 1958; Hooghe & Marks 
2008).  In other words, it was not until measures like the Single European Act and Maastrict 
Accords that integration processes were made manifest at the mass public level (Hooghe & 
Marks 2008). 
Indeed, this generation’s formative, institutional context included the European 
Union, a single European market and currency, as well as common foreign and commercial 
trade policies.  The formal institutional landscape was also populated with entities like the 
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European Parliament, European Central Bank and European Court of Justice, which 
possessed EU-wide jurisdiction.   Common European citizenship was established, complete 
with a flag, anthem and EU holiday (“Europe Day”).  Thus, given the highly consolidated 
environment surrounding the adolescent period of the age cohort born after 1975, this group 
should be strongly supportive of integration, even more so than previous ones.
1
 
Hypothesis III: Postwar Cohorts are more likely to be supportive of European 
integration than Prewar Cohorts. 
 
Hypothesis IV: The age-cohort born after 1975, Post-1975 Cohort, is more 
likely to be supportive of European integration than previous cohorts. 
  
           Finally, Inglehart’s theory includes implications at the aggregate or macro level.  As 
postwar generations, with higher cognitive, political skill levels and more postmaterially 
oriented values, slowly replace prewar those of the prewar era, over time the aggregate level 
of postmaterialism and cognitive, political mobility should increase.  Consequently, as the 
rate of postmatieral values and cognitive, political mobility rises, so too should support for 
integration at the macro level. 
                       Hypothesis V: Aggregate postmaterialism should be positively related to   
                       European Integration Support.   
 
                      Hypothesis VI: Aggregate cognitive,political mobility level should be positively     
                      related to European Integration Support.   
 
RESEARCH DESIGN  
Data & Methods  
I use longitudinal data from Eurobarometer Surveys extending from 1973-2011 and 
                                                             
1
 In addition to the theoretical justification for setting the generational line at 1975, available EB data after 2002 
also constrains our options for designating what year marks the outset of different age cohorts to ten year 
increments at the very least. 
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including sixteen EU nations (Figure 3).
2
 These surveys span several decades and feature a 
wide variety of individual information from demographic to public opinion trends.  The 
usage of a large dataset mitigates the possibility that the conclusions drawn from the analyses 
reflect random processes and also reduce problems such as multicollinearity, interference 
from unsystematic factors, and heteroskedasticity (Greene 1993; Corlett 1990; King, 
Keohane & Verba 1994).  Since some of the predictors and control variables may be 
correlated a large number of observations is necessary to estimate the relationships 
accurately.  To account for the multilevel nature of these data and to control for possibly 
confounding trending over time, I use cross-sectional, time-series logistic regression to 
evaluate the hypotheses at the micro and meso levels
3
.  I evaluate the macro hypotheses 
cross-sectional ordinary least-squares regression model with fixed effects and robust standard 
errors.
4
 
Dependent Variable   
The dependent variable “Integration Support,” adapted from the EB dataset, is the 
response to the following question, which has consistently appeared on EB surveys from 
1973-2011.   The response to this question speaks to the individual’s level of satisfaction and 
support for unification and its effects.  It has been empirically substantiated that the answer to 
this question captures the respondents’ support for integration and is the standard measure of 
                                                             
2
 The following nations are included within this analysis: France, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Austria, Sweden, and 
Norway (only 1990-96). 
EB surveys from 1970-2002 can be accessed through the Manheim Trend File: 
http://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer/topics-trends/eb-trends-trend-files/mannheim-eb-trend-file/.  Surveys from 
2003 and later (also accessible through the gesis website) were merged with the Manheim file to create a 
harmonized dataset from 1970-2011. 
 
3
 The micro and meso models include fixed effects for year and random effects for nation. 
 
4
 All of the full models including coefficients for our year dummy variables are located within the appendix. 
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integration support in the literature (Anderson & Reichert 1996; Anderson 1998; Carey 2002; 
Gabel 1998a, 1998 b; McLaren 2002; Olsson 2006; Dalton & Eichenberg 2007). 
Generally speaking, do you think that <your Country’s> membership in the 
European Community is...?  (1) a good thing  (2) neither/nor (3) bad thing 
 
I have coded responses consistent with previous studies, transforming responses into 
a dichotomous measure of support (Ehin, 2001, Olsson 2006, Pérez-Nievas & Mata-López 
2011).  Respondents who saw EU membership as a ‘good thing’ are coded as 1 and all other 
responses as 0, allowing us to distinguish “firm supporters of integration” from others 
(Kentmen 2008).
5
   
Predictors  
To test the political values theory, I use Inglehart’s survey question created expressly 
for assessing postmaterialist value levels (Inglehart 1990).   Respondents were asked to 
which of the following should be his or her nation’s top two goals: 
(a) maintaining order  
(b) fighting rising prices  
(c) giving people more say in important government decisions 
(d) protecting freedom of speech  
 
Respondents choosing (a) and (b) as their first and second choices were coded 1 for 
‘materialist,’ while respondents choosing (c) and (d) were coded 3 for ‘postmaterialist.’  
Those who chose a mix of materialist and postmaterialist goals, e.g., (a) and (c), are coded 2 
for ‘mixed-materialist.’6 
                                                             
5
 In the macro-level model, this variable is continuous and is the mean of responses by nation in a given year. 
 
6
 It should be noted that Inglehart’s index has been criticized for its contextual sensitivity, i.e., its arguably 
outdated “inflation” priority, and that possible postmaterial trending is more likely an artifact of decreasing 
concern regarding inflation.  Other research, however, has demonstrated a true trend toward postmaterialism 
even in nations where inflation and crime rates are serious concerns (Hansen & Tol 2003). 
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I operationalize the Cognitive, Political Mobility variable in a manner consonant with 
previous works, combining one’s educational level with responses to the EB question 
regarding frequency of political discussion listed below (Janssen 1991).  Dummy variables 
representing each level of the indicator are featured within the models, using level 1 as the 
baseline of comparison.    
Do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives, co-workers to 
share your views? (1) Never (2) Rarely (3) From time to time (4) Often 
 
Cognitive, Political Mobility level is coded as follows:  
1: 16 years or less of schooling & discuss politics ‘never’  
2: 16 years or less & discuss politics ‘rarely’; 17-20 years or less of schooling 
& discuss politics ‘never’ 
3: 16 years or less or less & discuss politics ‘time to time’; 17-20 years or less 
& discuss politics ‘rarely’; 21 years or more of schooling older & discuss 
politics ‘never’ 
4: 16 years or less & discuss politics ‘often’; 17-20 years or less & discuss 
politics ‘time to time’; 21 years or more & discuss politics ‘rarely’ 
5: 17-20 years or less & discuss politics ‘often’; 21 years or more & discuss 
politics ‘time to time’ 
6: 21 years or more & discuss politics ‘often’ 
 
The Postwar Cohort variable is also coded consistent with Janssen’s, with those born 
after 1945 coded as 1 and those before 1931 as 0.  I also include a dummy variable that 
consists of individuals born between 1932 and 1944 called Interwar Cohort.  Because these 
individuals’ formative experience largely occurred within the context of war, we do not have 
solid expectations about their likelihood of integration support (Jannsen 1991).  
The Post-1975 Cohort variable is coded 1 for those born in or after 1975 and 0 for 
those born in 1974 and before. 
In the macro model, Postmaterialism and Cognitive, Political Mobility are the mean 
values for each nation in a given year. 
10 
 
Control Variables   
In addition to the aforementioned predictors, I include several variables that are 
traditionally featured in European integration research and are designed to control for 
potentially confounding factors.  Female is a dummy variable coded 1 for females and 0 for 
males.  Research has consistently found females to be less supportive of integration efforts 
than males (Inglehart 1990; Morgan & Wilcox 1992; Caldeira & Gibson 1995; Gabel 1998a; 
Nelsen & Guth 2000).  I also include dummy variables representing the respondent’s Age 
Segment, in which the individual is coded 1 for 55-and-over, 2 for 40-54, 3 for 25-39 and 4 
for 15-24 years of age.   
I include dummy variables for the following occupational groups: 
Professionals/Executives & Labor.
7
  Ideology is based upon the respondents’ self-placement 
on the left-to-right ideological spectrum.  Respondents on the ‘left’ are coded as 1, ‘center’ as 
2 and ‘right’ as 3.   
Eurozone Member is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the individual’s home 
nation has formally joined the EMU and 0 for those living within Great Britain, Sweden and 
Denmark, which are a part of the EU but not EMU.  Net Contributor indicates whether the 
individual’s nation is a net contributor to or recipient of the EC/EU.  Net Contributor is 
coded as 1 and Net Recipient as 0.
8
   
            Within the macro model, I control for objective macroeconomic indicators GDP 
Growth, Inflation and Unemployment, which are typically included within macro-level 
                                                             
7
 Income information was no longer included on EB surveys after 2004 and is not included within the tables 
presented.  It should be noted, however, that the models were run with the inclusion of income and the results 
remained consistent with those the tables featured. 
 
8
 The European Commission categorizes the following nations as “Net Recipients”: Ireland, Spain, Portugal, 
Greece and “Net Contributors”: France, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, United 
Kingdom, Finland, Sweden, Austria. 
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analyses (Dalton & Eichenberg 1993, 2007).   The macroeconomic indicators come from 
OECD measures of national-level Inflation, Unemployment and GDP.
9
  
ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION 
The results of our cross-sectional panel analyses provide empirical confirmation for 
the majority of Inglehart’s Silent Revolution hypotheses with regard to integration support.  
The results for each level are discussed in the sections below, beginning with the micro, then 
meso and concluding with the macro findings.  
Micro Level At the micro-level, the models confirm both Postmaterialism and 
Cognitive, Political Mobility as significant, positive determinants of individual integration 
attitudes.  Table 1 features the coefficients from our regression analysis in column one and 
their associated odds ratios in column two.
10
  Figures 1 and 2 display the mean of Integration 
Support for each level of Postmaterialism and Cognitive, Political Mobility, respectively.  
While holding other factors constant, Postmaterialism is positively related to Integration 
Support at a significance level of p<.0001.  A one-unit increase in Postmaterialism raises the 
odds of Integration Support around 1.1 times.   
The model also demonstrates a direct relationship between Cognitive, Political 
Mobility level and Integration Support.  Compared to the baseline group, i.e., Cognitive, 
Political Mobility Level 1, the odds of integration support among individuals with a mobility 
level of 2 are around 1.1 times higher.  The odds of support increase to 1.2 times more likely 
for those of mobility level 3 and to 1.5 for individuals of level 4.  Finally, the odds of 
                                                             
9
 GDP - real gross domestic product percentage change over previous year; Inflation rate - Percentage change 
over previous year; Unemployment -Harmonized unemployment rate as percentage of total labor force. 
 
10
 The models were also run using a disaggregated Cognitive, Political Mobility variable, in which education 
and political discussion frequency are separated.  The alternate model specification had a negligible impact on 
the level, direction and significance of the coefficients.  This model is included within the Appendix. 
. 
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Integration Support among individuals of Cognitive, Political Mobility levels 5 and 6, are 
around 1.6 times greater than the baseline group.   
Contrary to Janssen’s “conjecture” that integration support among postmaterialists is 
more likely a function higher cognitive, political levels than value orientation, the model 
demonstrates that postmaterialism is an independent determinant of integration support.  Of 
course, the results do not suggest that value orientation and cognitive, political levels are the 
only or strongest determinants of integration attitudes.  They do, however, demonstrate that 
at the micro level, while controlling for a number of other factors, Postmaterialism and 
Cognitive, Political Mobility are meaningful predictors of support.   
Meso Level The results of our meso or age-cohort analysis are presented in Tables 2 
and 3.  Table 2 includes models 2-4, which do not include the Postmaterialism predictor, 
while Table 3 features models 5-7 with Postmaterialism.  The findings produce conflicting 
results for our Postwar Cohorts variable.  In model 2, this predictor is positively related to 
the dependent variable, though the coefficient value is small at .0200.  The Interwar Cohort 
is significant and negatively associated with Integration Support, however, the odds of 
support for this group is only two percent lower than those not within this cohort.  When 
including the Postmaterialism predictor in model 5, the Interwar Cohort loses significance, 
and the Postwar Cohorts variable becomes negatively associated with Integration Support.   
That is, once we take into account individual value orientation, the positive relationship 
between Postwar generations and Integration Support is lost.   Thus, while we cannot 
confirm Inglehart’s hypothesis regarding Postwar Cohorts, the sensitivity of this group’s 
relationship with support revealed within the tests is not too surprising given the 
disproportionately small number of respondents within the dataset born in the prewar era.    
13 
 
The models provide solid support for our hypothesis regarding the Post-1975 Cohort.   
In both models 3 and 6 Post-1975 Cohort is statistically significant at a level of p< .0001 and 
positively related to Integration Support.  Even while controlling for Postmaterialism, the 
odds of support among individuals of this generation are around 1.5 times greater than of 
those of earlier ones.   
Although the test results demonstrate the expected relationship between the Post-
1975 Cohort and Integration Support, the findings of models 4 and 7, which includes our 
Age Segment variables make it impossible to determine with a great degree of certainty that 
life-cycle effects are not in fact driving the relationship between this cohort and support.  
Consistent with the micro model, Age Segment 15-24 is more likely to be supportive of 
integration than other segments at a significance level of p<.0001.  The odds of support for 
Age Segment 15-24 are around 1.2 times higher in model 4 and 1.1 times in model 7 than the 
baseline group.  Since the dataset extends through the year 2011, the vast majority of 
individuals within the Post-1975 Cohort also fall within Age Segment 15-24.  Thus, the 
positive relationship between the Post 1975 Cohort and Integration Support could be a 
function of life-cycle effects, where young adults, for reasons outside the scope of this 
research effort, are significantly more supportive of integration than those at a later stage in 
life. 
Whether generational or life-cycle effects potentially drive attitudes could have 
markedly different implications for integration support in the future.  If Inglehart’s 
generational thesis is correct, as long as the European Union and its constituent institutionary 
parts remain consolidated or perhaps even tighten further, then we should expect support to 
remain solid, if not increase.  However, if life-cycle effects are more at work, the future may 
14 
 
likely hold a decline in support.  That is, with Europe’s low fertility rate and growing life 
expectancy, a larger proportion of the population will fall within the 55-or-older age range 
(Eurostat Release 2011).
11
  If it is the case that, for whatever reasons, individuals 55 and 
older are generally less supportive of integration, we should expect the balance of integration 
attitudes to tip toward the negative side. Clearly more research should be dedicated to 
investigating which, if either, generational or life-cycle effects guide integration attitudes.  
The results of the meso models also reaffirm our micro level findings regarding 
Postmaterialism and Cognitive, Political Mobility’s relationship with Integration Support.  In 
all three of the meso models(Table 3, models 5-7), Postmaterialism is statistically significant 
at p<.0001 and positively related to the likelihood of Integration Support.  Consistent with 
the micro model, the meso tests indicate that a one-unit increase in postmaterial value level 
raises the odds of support 1.1 times.  Hence, even when controlling for generational factors, 
value orientation appears to have an independent effect on the likelihood of integration 
support at the individual level. 
In addition, the models again demonstrate a direct relationship between Cognitive, 
Political Mobility level and Integration Support.  Compared to the baseline group, i.e., 
Cognitive, Political Mobility Level 1, the odds of integration support among individuals with 
a mobility level of 2 are around 1.1 times higher.  The odds of support increase to 1.2 times 
more likely for those of mobility level 3 and to 1.5 for individuals of level 4.  Finally, the 
odds of Integration Support among individuals of Cognitive, Political Mobility levels 5 and 
6, are around 1.6 times greater than the baseline group when also controlling for 
Postmaterialism and 1.8 times greater without it.   
                                                             
11
For more information regarding the EU’s demographic trends please see: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-01042011-BP/EN/3-01042011-BP-EN.PDF. 
 
15 
 
Macro Level The results of the macro level analysis are presented in Table 4.  The 
macro analysis investigates the extent to which differences in support among, as well as 
shifts within, the sixteen nations correspond with changes in aggregate levels of value 
orientation and cognitive, political skill levels. According to Inglehart’s theory, a more 
postmaterialist value climate and higher level of cognitive, political mobilization result in a 
higher degree of public support for integration.   The findings of our cross-sectional, time-
series regression model confirm the hypothesis regarding Cognitive, Political Mobility and 
Integration Support.  Cognitive, Political Mobility is a statistically significant and positive 
predictor of Integration Support, with a coefficient of .3027 and significance level of 
p<.0001.  It does appear that societal rises in cognitive, political levels are accompanied by 
an increase in positive integration attitudes.     
The tests, however, do not demonstrate value orientation as a significant determinant 
of integration attitudes at the aggregate level.  While holding other factors constant, the 
Postmaterialism indicator fails to achieve statistical significance in our model.  The results 
from a bivariate analysis of the relationship between aggregate Postmaterialism and 
Integration Support, however, indicate a positive association between this predictor and 
support with a coefficient of .2875 and significance level at p<.0001 (Table 5).  Further 
statistical analyses reveal that while there is significant variation in postmaterial levels across 
the nations, once we control for Cognitive, Political Mobility, which is highly correlated with 
Postmaterialism at .67, the relationship between Postmaterialism and Integration Support is 
lost at the aggregate level.
12
  The tests thus suggest that the independent impact of value 
orientation with regard to integration attitudes is likely limited to the micro level, due to the 
                                                             
12
 The analysis of variance results (ANOVA) for postmaterialism across the nations, as well as the full 
correlation matrix for the macro model is located within the appendix. 
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high degree of correlation between aggregate Postmaterialism and Cognitive, Political 
Mobility.   
CONCLUSION 
The primary purpose of this article was not to substantiate Inglehart’s Theory as the 
dominant explanation of integration support, but to fill a major gap in the literature.  This 
study answered Janssen’s “plea” for more rigorous statistical analysis of Inglehart’s Silent 
Revolution Theory using cross-sectional, panel data.  Expanding Inglehart and Janssen’s data 
from four nations to sixteen EU member nations over a period of more than three decades 
enables us to perform an adequate evaluate of the Silent Revolution Theory with regard to 
European integration support.  While not all of the hypotheses are confirmed in the analysis, 
several key aspects of Inglehart’s theory are substantiated.  
At the micro level, the tests confirmed both Inglehart’s hypotheses regarding the 
impact of value orientation and cognitive skills on integration attitudes.  Individuals with 
higher cognitive, political mobility levels are more supportive of integration than those of 
lower levels.  The model results demonstrate a robust relationship between cognitive, 
political mobility and integration support at the individual level.  Contrary to Janssen’s 
finding that integration support among postmaterialists is more likely a function of higher 
cognitive, political skills, our analyses indicate postmaterial value orientations to be an 
independent, significant predictor of positive integration attitudes.  Again, across the models, 
the direct relationship between postmaterialism and integration support among individuals is 
robust. This is not to say that value orientation and cognitive, political skills are the primary 
determinants of support, but rather that there is a confirmed, statistically significant positive 
relationship between these factors and favorable integration attitudes.  Indeed, it is reasonable 
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to expect that value orientation and political skills interact with a number of other potential 
factors, such as occupation or ideology, to form an individual’s preferences regarding 
integration-related issues. 
The results of our meso or age-cohort tests produce support for one of our two 
associated hypotheses.  The models produce a very weak relationship between the postwar 
cohorts predictor and integration support.  The results show that once we account for the 
individual’s postmaterial orientation, postwar generations appear to be less supportive, albeit 
minimally, than their prewar counterparts.  Of course, given the disproportionately small 
amount of individuals that fall into the prewar cohort compared to the postwar, these results 
are not too surprising.   
The tests do, however, substantiate the post-1975 cohort as being more supportive of 
integration than previous ones.  Unfortunately, we cannot conclusively attribute this 
relationship to Inglehart’s generational thesis, as our findings of the age segment control 
variable could also explain the aforementioned relationship.  Our analysis highlights the 
importance of future research into the issue of whether generational or life-cycle effects 
potentially drive integration attitudes, as the implications of each vary considerably.  That is, 
if generational shifts are at work, then integration support in the future should remain 
relatively solid.  If, however, life-cycle effects are actually at hand, then a decline in support 
may be in store as a disproportionate amount of the European population falls within the less 
supportive, 55-and-older life stage.   
Finally, at the macro level the tests confirm the relationship between aggregate 
cognitive, political mobility and integration attitudes.  Higher societal levels of cognitive, 
political mobility are positively related to integration support.  Value orientation at the 
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aggregate level, however, is not demonstrated to be an independent predictor of integration 
attitudes, as once cognitive, political mobility levels are accounted for, postmaterialism loses 
statistical significance.  The tests suggest that while cognitive, political mobility may carry 
an impact on integration attitudes at the micro and macro levels, value orientations may be 
limited to simply that of the individual.  Thus, while the tests may not be able to prove the 
occurrence of Inglehart’s revolution, they are finally able to lend empirical support to several 
key components of his theory.  
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Table 1: Micro Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time-series, cross-sectional logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses, 
using membership support as the dependent variable ***p<.0001, **p<.001, *p<.05 
 
 
 
 
Predictors 
 
Coef. Odds Ratios. 
Postmaterialism .0648*** 
(.0063) 
1.1 
Cognitive, Political Mobility  
   Level 2 
.0950*** 
(.0151) 
1.1 
   Level 3 .2538*** 
(.0147) 
1.2 
   Level 4 .3871*** 
(.0158) 
1.5 
   Level 5 .4902*** 
(.0194) 
1.6 
   Level 6 .4702*** 
(.0282) 
1.6 
Professionals/Executives .4042*** 
(.0204) 
1.5 
Labor -.3043*** 
(.0107) 
.7 
Ideology .2444*** 
(.0051) 
1.3 
Net Contributor .0812*** 
(.0106) 
1.1 
Eurozone Member 1.107*** 
(.0111) 
3.0 
Female -.2303*** 
(.0079) 
.8 
Age Segment 
  40-54 
.0031 
(.0108) 
1.0 
  25-39 -.0350* 
(.0108) 
1.0 
  15-24 .0484*** 
(.0124) 
1.0 
cons -1.031*** 
(.0385) 
.4 
obs 347214 
Wald chi2 (36)24309.57 
Prob > chi2  0.0000 
Log likelihood -209548.5 
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Table 2: Meso Level Models: Model 2- Postwar Cohorts, Model 3- Post 1975 Cohort, Model 4- Age Segments 
Time-series, cross-sectional logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses, 
 and using membership support as the dependent variable ***p<.0001, **p<.001, *p<.05 
 
 
Predictors 
Model 2 
Postwar 
Cohort 
Model 2 
Odds 
Ratios 
Model 3 
Post 1975 
Cohort 
Model 3 
Odds 
Ratios 
Model 4 
Age 
Segments 
Model 4 
Odds 
Ratios 
Postwar Cohorts 
.0200** 
(.0062) 1.1 - - - - 
Interwar Cohort 
-.0230* 
(.0090) .9 - - - - 
Post 1975 Cohort - - 
.3898*** 
(.0134) 1.5 - - 
Age Segment 40-54 - - - - 
.0008 
(.0071) 1.0 
25-39 - - - - 
-.0039 
(.0071) 1.0 
15-24 - - - - 
.1684*** 
(.0084) 1.2 
Cognitive, Political 
Mobility Level 2 
.1217*** 
(.0114) 1.1 
.1212*** 
(.0107) 1.1 
.1158*** 
(.0107) 1.1 
Level 3 
.2954*** 
(.0111) 1.3 
.2861*** 
(.0104) 1.3 
.2806*** 
.0104) 1.3 
Level 4 
.4650*** 
(.0117) 1.5 
.4520*** 
(.0110) 1.5 
.4420*** 
(.0112) 1.5 
Level 5 
.5904*** 
(.0134) 1.8 
.5727*** 
(.0132) 1.8 
.5654*** 
(.0133) 1.8 
Level 6 
.5934*** 
(.0193) 1.8 
.5757*** 
(.0187) 1.8 
.5748*** 
(.0187) 1.8 
Professionals/ 
Executives 
.3511*** 
(.0144) 1.4 
.3664*** 
(.0137) 1.4 
.3772*** 
(.0138) 1.4 
Labor 
-.3292*** 
(.0077) .7 
-.3212*** 
(.0072) .7 
-.3223*** 
(.0074) .7 
Ideology 
.1412*** 
(.0035) 1.2 
.1444*** 
(.0033) 1.2 
.1449*** 
(.0033) 1.2 
Net Contributor 
-.3190*** 
(.0079) .7 
-.2900*** 
.0078) .7 
-.2857*** 
(.0078) .8 
Eurozone Member 
.7640*** 
(.0081) 2.1 
.7656*** 
(.0080) 2.2 
.7653*** 
(.0080) 2.2 
Female 
-.2636*** 
(.0054) .7 
-.26011*** 
(.0052) .8 
-.2596*** 
(.0052) .8 
cons 
-.5277*** 
(.0357) .6 
-.5679*** 
(.0353) .5 
-.6065*** 
(.0265) .5 
obs 
Wald chi2 
Prob > chi2 
Log likelihood 
682140 
(46) 39896.80 
0.0000 
-427820.1 
 
736665 
(47)43237.15 
0.0000 
-462399.22 
 
736665 
(49) 42927.71 
0.0000 
-462558.63 
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Table 3: Meso Level Models w/ Postmaterialism  
Predictors 
w/postmaterialism 
Model 5 
Postwar 
Cohort 
Model 5 
Odds 
Ratios 
Model 6 
Post 1975 
Cohort 
Model 6 
Odds 
Ratios 
Model 7 
Age 
Segments 
Model 7 
Odds 
Ratios 
Postwar Cohort -.0220* 
(.0093) 
.9 - - - - 
Interwar Cohort -.0019 
(.0130) 
.9 - - - - 
Post 1975 Cohort - - .4353*** 
(.0457) 
1.5 - - 
Age Segment 
40-54 
- - - - .0031 
(.0108) 
1.0 
25-39 - - - - -.0350 
(.0108) 
.9 
15-24 - - - - .0484*** 
(.0124) 
1.0 
Postmaterialism .0735*** 
(.0065) 
1.1 .0658*** 
(.0062) 
1.1 .0648*** 
(.0063) 
1.1 
Cognitive, Political 
Mobility Level 2 
.0953*** 
(.0158) 
1.1 .0959*** 
(.0151) 
1.1 .0950*** 
(.0151) 
1.1 
Level 3 .2585*** 
(.0153) 
1.3 .2543*** 
(.0146) 
1.3 .2538*** 
(.0147) 
1.3 
Level 4 .3966*** 
(.0165) 
1.5 .3895*** 
(.0156) 
1.5 .3871*** 
(.0158) 
1.5 
Level 5 .4895*** 
(.0201) 
1.6 .4909*** 
(.0193) 
1.6 .4902*** 
(.0194) 
1.6 
Level 6 .4644*** 
(.0292) 
1.6 .4667*** 
(.0282) 
1.6 .4702*** 
(.0282) 
1.6 
Professionals/ 
Executives 
.3952*** 
(.0215) 
1.5 .3960*** 
(.0203) 
1.5 .4042*** 
(.0204) 
1.5 
Labor -.3077*** 
(.0111) 
.7 -.3088*** 
(.0104) 
.7 -.3043*** 
(.0107) 
.74 
Ideology .2385*** 
(.0053) 
1.3 .2455*** 
(.0051) 
1.3 .2444*** 
(.0051) 
1.3 
Net Contributor .0433*** 
(.0108) 
1.0 .0796*** 
(.0106) 
1.0 .0812*** 
(.0106) 
1.1 
Eurozone Member 1.079*** 
(.0114) 
2.9 1.107*** 
(.0111) 
3.0 1.107*** 
(.0111) 
3.0 
Female -.2342*** 
(.0082) 
.8 -.2322*** 
.0078) 
.8 -.2303*** 
(.0079) 
.8 
cons -1.204*** 
(.0408) 
.3 -1.029*** 
(.0384) 
.4 -1.031*** 
(.0385) 
.4 
obs 
Wald chi2 
Prob > chi2 
Log likelihood 
322375 
(35) 22344.53 
0.0000 
-194436.63 
 347214 
(34)24352.34 
0.0000 
-209527.99 
 347214 
(36) 24309.57 
0.0000 
-209548.5 
 
Time-series, cross-sectional logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses, 
 and using membership support as the dependent variable ***p<.0001, **p<.001, *p<.05 
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Table 4: Macro Model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
OLS time-series cross-sectional, fixed effects estimates with robust  
standard errors in parentheses. Dependent Variable-Membership Support 
 ***p<.0001, **p<.001, *p<.05 
 
 
Table 5: Bivariate Analysis between Aggregate Postmaterialism and Integration Support 
Predictors Coef. 
Postmaterialism 
 
.2875** 
(.0888) 
 Cons 
 
.0954 
(.1611) 
Obs  312 
R-sq: within 0.1271 
between 0.1033 
overall 0.0081 
Prob > F 0.0048 
 
Predictors Coeficient 
Cognitive, Political 
Mobility 
.3207** 
(.0842) 
Postmaterialism .0094 
(.0584) 
Ideology .1627 
(.1697) 
GDP .0116* 
(.0036) 
Inflation -.0002 
(.0026) 
Unemployment -.0063 
(.0043) 
Age  -.0258 
(.0326) 
_cons -.2226 
(.4037) 
Number of obs 240 
 Prob > F 0.0008 
R2   within 0.3081 
between = 0.0055 
overall = 0.1375 
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Figure 1: Means of Integration Support          Figure 2: Means of Integration Support 
by level of Postmaterialism           by level of Cognitive, Political Mobility 
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Figure 3: Nations and years included in EB dataset 
NATION YEARS 
France 1970-2011 
Belgium 1970-2011 
The Netherlands 1970-2011 
Germany West 1970-2011 
Italy 1970-2011 
Luxembourg 1973-2011 
Denmark 1973-2011 
Ireland 1973-2011 
Great Britain 1973-2011 
Northern Ireland 1974-2011 
Greece 1980-2011 
Spain 1985-2011 
Portugal 1985-2011 
Germany East 1990-2011 
Norway 1990-1995 
Finland 1993-2011 
Sweden 1994-2011 
Austria 1994-2011 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
INSTITUTIONS & INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE CHANGES: 
An Evaluation of the EMU’s Impact on Individual Integration Preferences 
 
 
The proceedings of every individual’s day are in some way an artifact of the particular set of 
institutions under which he or she lives.  Broadly conceived of as the mechanisms that 
structure and regulate all social interaction, institutions can range from customs, traditions 
and taboos to constitutions, laws and political bodies.  Institutional scholarship represents a 
cornerstone of social science scholarship, and this paper seeks to contribute the “internal” 
side of this research area, which focuses on the dynamic between institutions and individuals.  
I will evaluate whether the institutional establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) had an impact on public opinion of the process of European unification.  If, indeed, 
shifts in public integration opinion followed the EMU’s establishment, I then explore 
whether those changes run parallel with the predictions of integration research’s two 
dominant theoretical branches: utilitarian economic explanations, wherein opinions follow in 
the direction of economic gains or losses, and constructivist/identity-based accounts, in 
which opinion shifts are the result of socialization processes. 
The formation of the European Union and its constituent institutionary parts provides a 
unique natural experiment wherein this issue can be evaluated.  The European Union’s 
development has been a well-documented process, with by-country polls charting public 
opinion on a broad range of social, political and economic trends, and policies having been 
conducted since the 1970s. While a strong body of research explores the factors that drive 
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positive or negative views of European integration, many of the rational material studies 
were conducted before the official establishment of the EMU or during its infancy.  In the 
decade since the EMU’s establishment, the region has experienced remarkable economic 
growth as well as turmoil.  Given the significance and amount of public opinion data that 
have recently become available, further exploration of this topic represents a worthwhile 
research effort. 
My data come from two large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal surveys: the 
Eurobarometer (1973-2011) and European Values Surveys (1990-2009).  I have the luxury of 
quasi-control cases - Britain, Sweden and Denmark - as these nations are a part of the 
European Union but have chosen to remain outside of the EMU.  To evaluate whether the 
EMU’s establishment had an impact on integration views and to determine whether the shifts 
seem to vary among certain, identifiable segments of society, I compare support among 
groups in the period prior to the EMU’s establishment (pre-period) to that of the years 
following its introduction (post-period).  The results will hopefully contribute to the 
empirical side of this scholarship and perhaps lend greater understanding of the dynamic 
between institutions and individuals. 
Constructivist Explanations of Individual Integration Preference Changes  
Following the Great Wars, European regional integration efforts were started in hopes that 
this process would create such economic prosperity that the potential for conflict among the 
states would be erased.  Ultimately, the process was anticipated to give rise to a single 
political, cultural and economic European entity.  Supra-national institutional establishments 
(informal and formal) coupled with incremental policy changes were to be the wheels of this 
consolidation.  Through their auspices, it was anticipated that individual perceptions and 
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preferences would be reshaped so that collectively defined identities and interests would 
eventually supplant national, self-interested ones.    
With its implicit belief in the transformative capacity of institutions, the integration grand 
plan thus rests on constructivist-like logic, wherein the cultivation of collective beliefs and 
norms possesses the causal capacity to transform individual identities, opinions, interests and 
preferences fundamentally.  Constructivism’s ideational approach, similar to socio-
historicalism’s “logic of appropriateness,” represents one of the two main theoretical 
explanations on the issue of public opinion changes.   This approach is premised upon the 
primacy of social facts, which are the product of the collectively held beliefs that remain only 
because everyone in the society honors their existence (Lukes 1973; Abdelal, Blyth, & 
Parsons 2010).  Social facts may also be referred to as norms or “standards of appropriate 
behavior for actors with a given identity” imbued with causal capacity (Finnemore & Sikkink 
1998).   
According to this approach, individual preferences are endogenous to social constructs and 
are derived according to a “logic of appropriateness,” or in alignment with the prevailing set 
of norms and conventions which define their correctness in terms of social propriety (March 
& Olsen 1984, 2004).  Hence institutions are essentially a manifestation of the social context 
and serve as a as a purveyor of individual roles, preferences, and identity (Asch 1952; 
Giddens 1984).   As Aaron Wildavsky states, preferences are the product of simply two 
questions, “who am I and what shall I do” (1989).  The fusion of beliefs, norms and 
institutions effectively produces a causal mechanism through which individual interests are 
constructed.  Prominent constructivist scholar Alexander Wednt argues that interests are 
social constructs, not material givens, and depend on “what is desired…or beliefs about how 
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to meet needs,” and thus vary according to the particular social facts that surround the 
individual (1999).  He further challenges the significance of material forces and factors 
within causal processes, instead contending that the content and distribution of ideas are what 
confer utility and power and hence drive the construction of interests.   
  The European integration process has served as the theoretical and empirical platform 
for a great deal of constructivist and sociohistorical scholarship exploring the causal capacity 
of institutions over individual attitudes and preferences (Deutsch 1957; Haas 1958; Inglehart 
1971a, 1971b, 1977, 2008;  Inglehart, Rabier & Reif 1991).  Ronald Inglehart’s “Silent 
Revolution” theory represents arguably one of the most seminal works in this area.  
According to his theory, individual attitudes and preferences are a product of the institutional 
context within which one’s formative years take place, as it is during this time the individual 
is instilled with certain values and attitudes that tend to persist throughout his or her lifetime 
(Inglehart 1971a, 1971b, 1977, 2008).  Thus he hypothesized that generations raised within 
the integration window would be imparted with values that steadily orient preferences toward 
non-traditional, postmaterial, collective priorities and away from traditional, materialist, 
individualistic ones.  The more consolidated the institutions of integration characterizing the 
environment in which one grows up, the more supportive of integration he or she should be.   
A key catalyst in his intergenerational transformation was the improvement of conditions 
within a peaceful and prosperous Western Europe for the development of the individual’s 
cognitive capacity.  Solid compulsory educational systems, advances in higher education 
opportunities and in mass communication, according to Inglehart, facilitated the individual’s 
development of cognitive, political skills needed to comprehend abstract processes like that 
of regional integration.  He reasons that because information concerning European 
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integration and supra-national politics is at a high level of abstraction, a heightened degree of 
cognitive, political capacity is needed to process and interpret relevant political messages and 
events.  Accordingly, individuals intellectually equipped to handle abstract dynamics and 
attune to political matters are less threatened by the process of integration, and are 
consequently more likely to be supportive of it than their peers of lower cognitive, political 
endowments (Inglehart 1970a, 1977; Inglehart, Rabier & Reif 1991).
13
  Thus over time as 
younger, cognitively mobilized, postmaterial generations replace older, materialist 
generations with lower cognitive mobility levels, integration support at the aggregate level 
should steadily increase (Inglehart 1970, 1971a, 1971b, 1978; Inglehart, Rabier & Reif 1991; 
Janssen 1991).   
Other constructivist-related accounts, such as the work of Hooghe and Marks, suggest that 
the most decisive institutional byproduct vis-à-vis preferences is identity as opposed to utility 
(2002, 2004).  They argue that national identity and its associated effects on policy attitudes 
are “continuously constructed through socialization and political conflict” cued by political 
elites (Hooghe & Marks 2004; Straty & Triandafyllidou 2003; Medrano 2003).  Their 
research demonstrates that political cues from elites on the far left and far right have 
cultivated a sense of “exclusive” national identity among their partisans in recent decades.   
As a result of exclusive identity orientation, partisans on the far left and right are less likely 
to hold positive European integration attitudes (Hooghe & Marks 2004, 2006, 2008).
14
    
                                                             
13 Even though higher education and attention levels may better enable the individual to perceive the potential 
costs of integration, these costs are offset by the cosmopolitan perspective and priorities that an advanced  
degree of cognitive mobility also cultivates (Inglehart 1970a, 1971b; Inglehart, Rabier & Reif 1991, Mansfield 
& Mutz 2008). 
 
14 Regarding identity, elite cueing and attitudes, see also Steenbergen, Edwards & de Vries 2007; Hobolt 2007; 
Medrano 2004).   
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Thus, according to constructivist explanations, socialization processes involving cognitive 
mobility level, value orientation and identity by way of partisanship can lead to changes in 
individual integration preferences.  We should expect the likelihood of integration support 
among those of high cognitive mobility levels and postmaterial values to be stronger in the 
post-EMU period as the proportion of the population possessing such characteristics 
increases over time, while support should be weaker during this period among individuals on 
the far left or right ends of the partisan spectrum.    
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of integration support will increase among Postmaterialists
15
 in 
the post-EMU period.
16
 
 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of integration support will increase among those of High 
Cognitive Mobility
17
 in the post-EMU period.
 18
   
 
Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of integration support will decrease among Far Left and Far 
Right
19
 Partisans in the post-EMU period.
20
   
 
 
                                                             
15 The Postmaterialists predictor is a dummy variable where 1 represents those who were classified as 
Postmaterialists according to the EVS and 0 if Materialist or Mixed-Materialist. 
 
16
 Because in the post-EMU era EB surveys only featured this question in 2005 and 2008, this variable is only 
included within the EVS model.   
 
17
 Consistent with the literature, in the EB models this variable is operationalized by adding the responses from 
the questions below then creating a dummy variable where scores of 6 or 7 were coded 1 for high cognitive 
mobility and scores of 5 or below as 0.  Do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives, co-workers 
to share your views? 
(1)Never(2) Rarely (3) From time to time (4) Often 
When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or 
never?(1) Never (2) Occasionally (3) Frequently  
The EVS variable combines the previous question and the following where scores of 6 or 7 were coded 1 for 
High Cognitive Mobility and scores of 5 or below as 0. 
How interested in politics are you? (1) Not at all interested (2) Not very (3)Somewhat (4) Very 
 
18
 Alternate codings of Cognitive Mobility combining education and political discussion were also included in 
the models but did not change the direction or significance of results.   
 
19
 The Far Left Partisans variable consist of individuals who self-placed themselves as a 1 or “very left” on a 5 
point left-right ideological scale.  Far Right Partisans consists of those who self-placed themselves as a 5 or 
“very right” on a 5 point left-right ideological scale. 
 
20
 A comparable variable, however, could not be constructed from the EVS data.  
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Rational-Material Explanations of Individual Integration Preference Changes 
Alternate explanations within the rational-material theoretical tradition assume that public 
preferences turn on utility gains or losses.   According to this approach, preferences embody 
their expectations of the impact that a policy or event will have on their income and most 
commonly hinge on occupational opportunities or losses. That is, this approach is predicated 
on utilistic implications and as such, individual preferences are fixed and exogenous.  
Material-based scholarship proffers that institutions emerge to help self-interested individuals 
achieve gains through social interaction.  Thus, institutions lack causal capacity and are 
simply the strategic instruments developed to facilitate the realization of collective benefits 
(Commons 1968; Shepsle 1975, 1979; Ostram 1980; North 1990, 1991).    
In contrast to the constructivist approaches, rational-material works do not accept the 
possibility of transforming the individual’s primary interest into anything beyond survival by 
way of utility. They do not, however, deprive institutions and other social facts from having 
an impact on individual opinions, actions and preferences.  Institutions exercise significant 
influence, as they set the parameters within which the individual must operate.  In other 
words, they determine the rules of the game that the individual must abide by in his attempts 
to maximize utility.   
Integration research employing a rational-material framework to evaluate the issue of public 
opinion change views unification institutions as a means for individuals to maximize 
individual interests first, and then collective gains result essentially by happenstance.   
Accordingly, every individual prefers an institutional design that gives him strategic 
advantage with regard to other actors and thereby yields him higher distributional returns 
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(Knight 1992; Sebenius 1992; Oatley 1999).  In effect, individuals adjust opinions in 
accordance with expectations about utility gains or losses. 
Utility-based frameworks explain shifts in personal integration preferences as a function of 
the direction in which the EMU (or EMS) affected individual returns to utility.  These studies 
largely focus on the EMU’s chief role in the consolidation of regional economic 
liberalization, as it greatly advanced the Treaty of Rome’s (1957)  goal of an open and 
unfettered pan-European market (Gabel 1998a, Scheve 2003).   The convergence of 
monetary policy fostered stability, thereby facilitating the free flow of goods, capital, and 
laborers across borders and the establishment of a single, unified economy. The broadened 
economic context meant that citizens were no longer oriented primarily within their domestic 
economy, but instead in an open regional economy where factors of production were allowed 
to move freely.  Specialization across national economies was reduced and national 
comparative advantages based on Heckscher-Ohlin logic disappeared (Kim 1995).  
Individuals who were once associated with their country’s abundant factor, those previously 
considered the “winners” from trade, thereafter faced more intense competition.   The 
economic returns for an unskilled or skilled worker now depended on how well he could 
compete with his occupational/sector counterparts throughout the entire region, not just his 
fellow countrymen. The unified market’s liberalization of product, capital, and labor flows 
reduced export transaction costs and thereby reduced the competitiveness of domestically 
oriented industries.  Conversely, the increase in investment opportunities for financial capital 
owners through market liberalization suggests that the EMU’s formation worked to the 
benefit of capital (Frieden 1991;  Gabel & Palmer 1995; Scheve 2003).    
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International economic openness also favors those with high levels of human capital - 
citizens with relatively high income, education, and occupational skills- as they are more apt 
to adjust to economic changes in their employment sector and reorient themselves within 
diverse international settings (Gabel 1998a; Frieden, & Rogowski 1996; Scheve & Slaughter 
1998; Hooghe & Marks 2004; Mayda & Rodrik 2005).   In contrast, individuals with lower 
levels of education and expertise have lesser-valued and mutable skills and are therefore 
more expendable and limited in adaptability during economic downturns.  The introduction 
of EU-wide competition for labor-intensive jobs enabled domestic firms to employ workers 
from any member state and adversely affected the competitiveness of manual laborers and 
those with lower human capital.  The argument that those with higher human capital levels 
would fare better under the auspices of the EMU has been substantiated by public surveys 
wherein professionals consistently express the belief that integration creates more job 
opportunities, while manual workers see it as a source of greater job competition (Gabel 
1998a).    
Matthew Gabel has conducted one of the most comprehensive research efforts on European 
integration attitudes within the utility-material tradition (1998a).  Using individual-level 
survey data on European integration, Gabel evaluates the assumption that individual 
preferences reflect the policy’s distributional implications.  Scrutinizing European public 
opinion data from 1975-1992 within a wide range of tests, Gabel provides evidence that 
individual integration attitudes are primarily a product of returns to personal income utility. 
Consistent with previous findings, he demonstrates that occupational skill levels form the 
dividing lines of opinion, with those in higher skilled or capital-intensive segments generally 
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more supportive of integration, as the process has afforded them greater income returns 
(Gabel & Palmer 1995; Scheve 1993, 1999, 2003; Scheve & Slaughter 2004).
21
 
Another utilitarian variant focuses on the relationship between partisanship, usually defined 
by class-based cleavages, and integration support (Franklin, Marsch, & Wlezien 1994; 
Franklin, Van der Eijk & March 1995; Inglehart, Rabier & Reif 1991).  According to the 
class partisanship explanation, integration attitudes are a function the position of one’s 
political party on the issue.  Using Eurobarometer surveys from 1973-1989, Inglehart, Rabier 
& Reif (1991) found that supporters of left parties were less likely to be supportive of 
unification efforts than right parties, mirroring the positions of left and right parties on 
European integration.  They reason that parties of the left have generally been more skeptical 
of integration than right-leaning parties which tend to interpret integration as a manifestation 
of capitalist forces (Garry & Tilley 2009; Brinegar, Jolly & Kitschelt 2004; Gabel 1998a, 
Wessels 1995;  Budge, Robertson & Hearl 1987).
22
  Others have explained increased support 
on the right as a result of the EMU’s liberalization of the market and the European Central 
Bank’s premium on inflation control, while the left has become less supportive as further 
integration is expected to dilute the welfare systems within social democratic states (Garry & 
Tilley 2009; Hooghe & Marks 2004; Brinegar, Jolly & Kitschelt 2004).   
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 Other economically oriented explanations of integration preferences focus on overall national economic 
performance, either in terms of objective macroeconomic indicators, e.g., GDP growth, inflation and 
unemployment (Dalton & Eichenberg 1993, 2007), or subjective individual assessments of the nation’s 
economic situation (Gabel & Whitten 1997). 
 
22
 Subsequent works have presented a more nuanced explanation of partisanship’s impact on integration 
support, emphasizing the need to consider the “variety of capitalism” within the individual’s home nation.  In 
other words, they hold the ideological basis of integration attitudes as conditional upon economic context, being 
either liberal market or social democratic states (Garry & Tilley 2009; Hooghe & Marks 2004;  Brinegar, et al 
2004).  Because integration is expected to dilute the welfare systems within social democratic states, such as 
Scandinavian countries, left-leaning individuals within these states are expected to be less supportive than their 
right-leaning peers.  Conversely, the anticipated increase in redistribution within liberal market systems like 
Britain leads the left to be more supportive of integration than the right (Hooghe & Marks 2004; Brinegar & 
Jolly 2005).  
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According to rational-material explanations, implications of the EMU’s establishment for 
personal utility returns could prompt changes in individual integration preferences.  
Specifically, support for integration should increase among those of high human capital, 
professionals/executives, and right-leaning partisans.  Conversely, integration support should 
decrease among laborers and left-leaning partisans.
23
   
Hypothesis 4: The likelihood of integration support will increase among those of High 
Human Capital
24
 in the post-EMU period. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The likelihood of integration support will increase among 
Professionals/Executives
25
 in the post-EMU period.  
 
Hypothesis 6: The likelihood of integration support will be positively associated with 
Partisanship
26
 in the pre and post-EMU periods and should increase among Right Partisans 
and decrease among Left Partisans in the post-EMU period. 
 
Hypothesis 7: The likelihood of integration support will decrease among Laborers in the 
post-EMU period. 
 
 
Data & Methods 
 
To evaluate integration shifts and patterns following the establishment of the EMU in 1999, I 
use longitudinal data from the Eurobarometer ranging from 1973-2011 as well as the 
European Values Survey from 1990-2009.   Both datasets span a great deal of time and 
feature a wide variety of individual information, from demographic to public opinion trends.  
Large datasets mitigate the possibility that the conclusions drawn from the analyses reflect 
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 Unfortunately, the EVS model does not include this variable, as these surveys have not consistently included 
a question on personal partisanship or ideology. 
 
24
 High Human Capital is a dummy variable where 1 represents those with 21 years or more of education and in 
the third or fourth income quartile within the EB data and the ‘high’ income bracket within the EVS.  All others 
are coded 0. 
 
25
 Occupational dummy variables are included for Professionals/Executives and Labor. 
 
26
 Partisanship is operationalized from the individual’s self-placement on a 5 point left-right ideological scale, 
within which 1 represents “very left,” 2 “left,” 3 “center,” 4 “right” and 5 “very right.”  
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random processes and also reduce problems such as multicollinearity, interference from 
unsystematic factors, and heteroskedasticity (Greene 1993;  Corlett 1990; King, Keohane & 
Verba 1994).  Since several of the indicators featured in the hypotheses may be correlated, a 
large number of observations is necessary to estimate the relationships accurately.   
The usage of dual longitudinal datasets provides greater assurance in the robustness of our 
results and covers pertinent predictors that one dataset may lack. Table 6 features the EB data 
models.  Model 1a includes the figures from the pre-EMU period and model 1b those from 
the post-EMU period.  Table 7 displays the EVS models, with model 2a corresponding to the 
pre-EMU period and 2b the post-EMU period.  In addition to the coefficients, the tables also 
include the percentage differential in support for each predictor group versus non-group 
members, as well as the predicted probability of integration support for each group with all 
other group values held at their median.
27
  These figures allow us to evaluate both relative 
and absolute changes in integration support levels among the predictor groups.    
All of the models were tested using cross-sectional logistic regression and including dummy 
variables for nation and year in order to account for the multilevel nature of these data and to 
control for possibly confounding trending over time.
28
  The results remained consistent with 
the results when using logistic regression techniques, which also included dummy variables 
for nation and year, so for ease of explanation I present only the results from these models.  
In order to determine whether changes in integration preferences occurred in the period 
following the EMU’s establishment, I compare the coefficients, percentage differences and 
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 Other values are held at their median rather than the mean when computing the predicted probabilities of 
integration support among the groups, because the majority of the groups are dummy variables.   
 
28
 Because xtlogit requires a dichotomous dependent variable, I recoded and tested this question in the following 
two ways: 1-good thing, 0-neither bad nor good & bad thing; 1-good thing, 0-bad thing.  Neither coding 
changed the direction or significance of the relationship between the predictors and dv.   
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predicted probabilities of the predictors in the post-EMU period (1999-2011) to those of the 
pre-EMU period (1973-1998).   
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable adopted from the EB dataset is the response to the question below, 
which has consistently appeared on EB surveys from 1973-2011.   The response to this 
question speaks to the individual’s level of satisfaction and support for unification and its 
effects.  It has been empirically substantiated that the answer to this question captures 
respondents’ support for integration (Anderson & Reichert 1996; Anderson 1998; Carey 
2002; Gabel 1998a, b; McLaren 2002; Olsson 2006; Dalton & Eichenberg 2007).  I have 
assigned numeric values to the possible responses to create an ordinal dependent variable, 
which is appropriate when using ordered logit models (Frieden, Weymouth & Broz 2008; 
Garavaglia & Sharma 1996). 
Generally speaking, do you think that your country's membership in the European 
Community is …? 
a bad thing  (2) neither good nor bad  (3) a good thing  
 
Ideally the dependent variable used in the EVS models would be identical to the EB, but this 
question has not been featured on EVS surveys.  The dependent variable used within the EVS 
analysis is the respondent’s answer to the question below, which has routinely been asked on 
these surveys since 1990 and used in the literature as a measure of integration support. 
Although the EVS has not been administered as frequently as the EB, the period which it 
covers lends an appropriate window of time for scrutinizing the hypotheses.  Responses of 
“quite a lot” and “a great deal” were recoded as 1, and responses of “none” and “not much” 
as 0.
29
 
                                                             
29
 Logistic regression analysis is used with the dichotomous EVS dependent variable of integration support. 
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How much confidence do you have in the European Community/European Union? 
(1) none   (2) not much  (3) quite a lot  (4) a great deal 
 
Control Variables  
I also include several variables that are traditionally featured in European integration research 
and are designed to control for potentially confounding factors.  I include demographic 
variables, including gender and age, which often influence political preferences and may be 
related to the explanatory variables.  The following controls are included: Female is a 
dummy variable coded “1” for females and is included in both EB and EVS analyses.  Age is 
also in both sets and coded like the majority of works, where 1 is the 15-24 year-old bracket, 
2 is the 25-39, 3 is the 40-54, and 4 is the 55-and-over.   
Eurozone Member is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the individual’s home nation 
has formally joined the EMU, and 0 represents those living within Great Britain, Sweden and 
Denmark, non-EMU members.   I expect respondents within EMU member nations to be 
more supportive of integration than their non-EMU counterparts.  I also include a dummy 
variable Net Recipient to control for whether or not the individual’s nation is a net 
contributor to or recipient of the EC/EU.  Individuals within a Net Recipient nation are coded 
as 1 and those in net contributor nations as 0.
30
   
In order to evaluate the potential difference in support among far left/right partisans relative 
to those closer to the center, we include the variable “Far L/R Partisan,” which is 
operationalized by squaring the values of the Partisanship predictor.  If our hypothesis is 
correct that individuals on the far sides of the partisan spectrum are less likely to be 
supportive of integration than those closer to the center, the Partisanship predictor should be 
                                                             
30
 The European Commission categorizes the following nations as “Net Recipients”: Ireland, Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, and “Net Contributors”: France, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, United 
Kingdom, Finland, Sweden, Austria 
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positively related to the dependent variable within the models, while Far L/R Partisan should 
be negatively associated. 
Results & Discussion 
Overall the models demonstrate distinguishable shifts in individual integration views 
following the EMU’s establishment; however, several run counter to their expected direction 
in the literature.  Perhaps one of the most surprising findings from our research is that 
aggregate integration support is lower in the post-EMU than in the pre-period.  Contrary to 
constructivist expectations, aggregate integration support has not risen over time as younger, 
postmaterialist and more cognitively mobilized generations replaced older, materialist and 
less cognitively mobilized ones.   Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the decline in aggregate 
integration support between the pre-EMU and post-EMU periods.  According to EB figures, 
the percentage of those supporting integration decreased from 62% to 56%, while EVS rates 
dropped from 57% to 41%.  “Net support,” another measure of integration support featured 
in the literature (the percentage difference between respondents who feel EC/EU membership 
is a 'bad thing' from those who saw it as a 'good thing'), decreased by a larger degree between 
the two periods, falling to 39% in the EB data and 28% in the EVS.  While holding all of the 
variables within the EB models at their median values, the predicted probability of overall 
integration support, i.e., the probability of those viewing EU membership as a ‘good thing,’  
drops .10 points from .69 in the pre-EMU period to .59 in the post.  The EVS models also 
demonstrate that the probability of support decreases by .10 points between the pre- and post-
EMU periods, from .58 to .48. 
Though we were not able to verify the constructive hypotheses in the aggregate sense, our 
statistical models provide qualified support for our expectations regarding High Cognitive 
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Mobility at the individual level.  The results of model 1 show that integration-relative support 
among those of High Cognitive Mobility increased from around 8% more likely than other 
groups in the pre-EMU period to 21% in the post-EMU era.  Within the EVS models the 
likelihood of relative support for this group increases from 20% to 27%.  The probability of 
support for this group in the absolute sense, however, does not increase in the post-EMU 
period, but decreases by a smaller margin than the overall population.  The models indicate 
that the probability of integration support for individuals of High Cognitive Mobility fell 
slightly by .03 and .05 points in the EB and EVS models, respectively, from .68 to .65 in the 
former and from .62 to .57 in the latter.  Thus while we cannot completely confirm our 
hypothesis concerning this predictor, the tests allow us to confirm that relative to other 
groups, integration support among those of High Cognitive Mobility did increase within the 
post period.   
The expected relationship between Postmaterialists and integration support, however, was 
not substantiated in the models.  The Postmaterialist predictor fails to achieve statistical 
significance in either the pre- or post-EMU period and precludes us from confirming this 
hypothesis or drawing any conclusions about changes in this group’s relative or absolute 
level of support between the pre and post periods (models 2a and 3b). 
The models yielded interesting findings with regard to our constructive and rational-material 
based hypotheses on Partisanship and Integration Support.  As expected, the models indicate 
that Partisanship is positively associated with support in both the pre and post periods, with 
coefficients of .5555 and .5388, respectively, and at a significance level of p<.0001.  
Contrary to our hypothesis, however, Right Partisans do not become more likely to be 
supportive of integration in the post-EMU period.  In fact, the probability of support for those 
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on the Right and Far Right actually decreases more during this period than for Left and Far 
Left Partisans.  The predicted probability of support for Right Partisans decreases by .11, 
which is greater than the overall population’s level, falling from .71 to .60. 31  Among the Far 
Right, the decline in probability of support is steeper at .17, dropping from .73 to .56.   
The probability of support for Far Left and Left Partisans also decreased in the post period: 
however, the decline was only by .02 and .06 points, respectively.  Contrary to expectations, 
the change in probability of support between the pre- and post- EMU periods decreases as we 
move right along the partisan spectrum.  While the probability of support for those on the 
Far Left remained the lowest of the partisan groups in the post period at .48, the probability 
of support for those on the Left is the same as those on the Far Right at .56.  Thus, in a 
relative sense, the models did not demonstrate that Left Partisans became less supportive of 
the integration process in the post-EMU period as expected.   
In terms of our constructivist hypotheses related to Partisanship, the models also produced 
somewhat mixed results.  The tests demonstrate that the Far L/R Partisan predictor is 
significant and negatively associated with the dependent variable in both periods.  This 
finding, in conjunction with Partisanship’s positive relationship with support, substantiates 
the thesis that individuals on the far ends of the partisan spectrum are less likely to be 
supportive of integration than those situated more toward the center.  The significant 
decrease in the probability of support among Far Right Partisans between the pre and post 
periods lends further support to the aforementioned argument.  The marginal decline in the 
probability of integration support among Far Left Partisans, however, suggests that 
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 When computing the predicted probabilities for each partisan group, the Far L/R was set at its associated 
squared value, e.g., if Partisanship=3, then Far L/R=9.  All other values were set at their medians.  
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exclusive identity cuing from political elites may largely be coming from those on the far 
right. 
The results concerning the remainder of our rational-material hypotheses were somewhat 
disappointing.  According to these accounts, groups poised to benefit financially from the 
EMU’s establishment, including Professionals/Executives and High Human Capital, should 
correspondingly become more supportive of the integration process in the post-EMU period, 
while groups adversely impacted, like Labor, should become less supportive.   Indeed this 
seems to be the case for Labor, as the models demonstrate a decline in this group’s 
integration support in the post-EMU period.  Across all three of the models, the likelihood of 
Integration Support for Labor relative to other groups, decreased in the post-EMU period, 
falling from 25% to 30% in the EB models and from 9% to 26% in the EVS tests.  In 
absolute terms, the predicted probability of support for Labor dropped .11 points between the 
pre and post periods in both the EB and EVS models, falling from .60 to .51 in the former 
and .55 to .44 in in the latter.     
By and large, the tests also confirm our hypothesis regarding increased support among 
individuals of High Human Capital in the post-EMU period.  The likelihood of Integration 
Support for this group relative to others increased from 20% to 27% in the EB models and 
from 11% to a substantially higher 53% in the post-EMU period.  Surprisingly, however, in 
absolute terms, the predicted probability of support for High Human Capital in the EVS 
models decreases slightly by .05, which is less than the overall population’s decline, from .62 
in the pre to .57 in the post period.  Within the EB models, the probability of support for this 
group increases as expected from .68 to .70.  Taken altogether, the test results allow us to 
confirm that relative to other groups, integration support among those of High Human 
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Capital did increase within the post period.  It should be noted that what defines one as High 
Human Capital are high education and income levels.  Thus, it may be possible to attribute 
increased support among this group to educational or cognitive factors rather than greater 
returns to personal utility in the post-EMU era.   
The findings provide qualified confirmation of our hypothesis regarding support among 
Professionals/Executives in the post-EMU period.  In the EB models the likelihood of 
support for this group increased minimally from 40% in the pre to 41% in the post period.  In 
the EVS model the likelihood of support for this group moved from an insignificant figure to 
31% more likely to be supportive of integration than non-Professionals/Executives.  The 
predicted probability of support among Professionals/Executives within the EB models 
decreases by .11 between the pre and post periods, falling from .75 to .64.  In the EVS 
models, the probability of support for this group decreases from .56 to .51.   Thus, while 
Professionals/Executives are demonstrated to be more likely than other groups to support 
integration, the corresponding increase in support expected to follow the EMU’s 
establishment is not substantiated in the models.  This finding is rather surprising considering 
that Professionals/Executives are expected to register a significant gain from economic 
liberalization and monetary harmonization in the region. 
   Finally, the results of our Eurozone Member control variable bear some discussion.  
Contrary to our expectations, the preferences of those within Eurozone Member nations do 
not appear to be distinctly more supportive of integration in the post period than their non-
member peers.   In the EB models, Eurozone Member is significant and positive in both 
periods, but the relative level of support for this group decreases in the post-EMU period.  
When these nations actually became Eurozone Members in the post-EMU period, the 
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likelihood of support for this group falls from 187% more supportive than others to 85%.  In 
absolute terms, the probability of support for Eurozone Members also declines in the post-
EMU period from .68 to .59.  The EVS models also demonstrate a decline in Integration 
Support among Eurozone Members in the post-EMU period in both relative and absolute 
terms.  According to these models, the likelihood of support for Eurozone Members relative 
to non-member nations decreases from 62% to 54% between these periods, while the 
probability of support drops from .58 to .48.   
Thus, in terms of our rational-material hypotheses, the analysis only provides conclusive 
confirmation of Labor’s expected decline in Integration Support within the post-EMU 
period.  While Professionals/Executives are still more likely to hold positive integration 
views in the post-EMU period than those outside of the groups, support among them did not 
increase during this period as expected.  Likewise, though right-leaning partisans appear to 
be more supportive than those on the Far Left, the probability of support among those on the 
Far Right is actually the same as those on the Left.  Contrary to expectations, the probability 
of support for those on the Right and Far Right decreased by a wider margin than those on 
the Left, Far Left and Center in the post-EMU period.    
These findings, along with the results of the Eurozone Member control, cast some doubt on 
rational-material explanations, which hold individual attitudes on integration as a product of 
economic gains or losses.  In other words, if individual preferences regarding integration are 
solely a reflection of personal utility returns, it is difficult to reconcile why the groups that 
stood to gain the most from regional market liberalization and monetary harmonization did 
not become more supportive following the EMU’s establishment.  Taking the results into 
consideration with those of High Cognitive Mobility and Far L/R Partisans at the micro level 
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suggests that future work regarding individual integration preferences may prove more 
fruitful when considering the potential interactive effect between socialization processes and 
economic orientation.  
Conclusion 
In this study we explored the relationship between institutions and individual preferences, 
specifically investigating whether the institutional establishment of the EMU had an impact 
on individual integration views.  Our statistical analysis provided strong evidence that 
individual integration preferences were impacted by the introduction of the EMU, but not all 
necessarily in the direction expected within the literature.   
In terms of our constructive-related framework, the tests generally demonstrated support for 
the High Cognitive Mobility and Far L/R Parisan hypotheses at the micro level, while failing 
to validate the Postmaterialist hypothesis.  Indeed, perhaps one of the most interesting 
findings within this research effort is substantial decrease in the probability of integration 
support among Far Right Partisans within the post-EMU period.  The macro-level 
expectations associated with these hypotheses, however, were not substantiated by the data.   
The models produced limited support for our rational-material hypotheses, as only the Labor 
hypothesis was firmly substantiated in the data.  The likelihood of integration preferences 
among Professionals/Executives moved in a direction counter to our theoretical expectations 
following the EMU’s establishment.  Likewise, the probability of support for right-leaning 
partisans decreased by a larger margin between the pre- and post-EMU periods than it did for 
those on the left.  If personal utility returns are the primary determinant of integration 
attitudes, as theorized in the rational-material research, it is difficult to understand why 
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attitudes in the post-EMU period do not directly correspond with the implications that this 
institution had on personal economic wellbeing.   
The findings of this paper thus suggest that future research within the area of integration 
attitudes need not exclusively side with either constructive or utility-based explanations of 
support.   Instead more focus should be directed toward the potential interactive effect 
between the two.  High Human Capital is just one potential way to connect the two sides, 
and hopefully more work will be devoted to uncovering additional bridges between them.   
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Table 6: EB Data 1973-2011 
 
Ordered logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses, and using EU membership support as the 
dependent variable.  The reported predicted probabilities correspond with responses that EU membership is a 
“good thing.” ***p<.0001, **p<.001, *p<.05 
 
 
Table 6: EB 
 
 
Pre-EMU 
(1973-1998) 
Model 1a 
 
 
Post-EMU 
(1999-2011) 
Model 1b  
 
predictors coef. 
% 
difference 
predicted 
probability 
 
Coef. 
% 
difference 
predicted 
probability 
High Cognitive 
Mobility 
0.075*** 
(.0093) 8 .68 
0.1880*** 
(.0222) 21 .65 
High Human 
Capital 
0.100*** 
(.0152 11 .68 
0.4277*** 
(.0246) 53 .70 
Professionals/ 
Executives 
0.3356*** 
(.0198) 40 .75 
0.3445*** 
(.04508) 41 .64 
Labor 
-0.2895*** 
(.0100) -25 .60 
-0.3546*** 
(.0229) -30 .51 
Partisanship 
0.5555*** 
(.0163) 74 - 
0.5388*** 
(.0380) 71 - 
Far L/R 
Partisan  
-0.0549*** 
(.0027) -5 - 
-0.0749*** 
(.0063) -7 - 
Far Left - - .50 - - .48 
Left   .61 - - .55 
Center - - .67 - - .59 
Right   .71 - - .60 
Far Right - - .73 - - .56 
Eurozone 
Member 
1.0565*** 
(.0154) 187 68 
0.6123*** 
(.0364) 85 59 
Net Recipient 
0.2999*** 
(.0197) - - 
1.409*** 
(.0583) - - 
Age 
-0.0388*** 
(.0037) -4 - 
-0.1570*** 
(.0079) -15 - 
Female 
-0.2293*** 
(.0074) -21 - 
-0.3120*** 
(.0164) -27 - 
Overall - - .69 - - .59 
Number of obs  
LR chi2 
Prob > chi2 
Log likelihood 
 
350073 
(47)53527.62 
0.0000 
-286437.98 
  65540 
(27) 7939.40 
0.0000 
--57198.779 
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Table 7: EVS Data 1990-2009  
 
Logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses, and using confidence in the EU as the dependent 
variable.  The reported predicted probabilities correspond responses of “quite a lot” or “a great deal” of 
confidence in the EU.   ***p<.0001, **p<.001, *p<.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
: EVS 
Dependent: 
EU Confidence 
PRE-EMU 
1990-1998 
    Model 2a 
 
 
POST-EMU 
1999-2009 
   Model 2b   
predictor coef. 
       % 
difference 
predicted 
probability coef. 
% 
difference 
predicted 
probability 
Postmaterialists 
-0.0271 
(.0343) -3 .57 
0.02871 
(.0474) 3 .49 
High Cognitive 
Mobility 
0.1833*** 
(.0353) 20 .62 
0.2380*** 
(.0437) 27 .57 
High Human 
Capital 
0.3200*** 
(.0462) 38 .65 
0.4132*** 
(.0509) 51 .62 
Professionals/ 
Executives 
-0.0593 
(.0545) -6 .56 
0.2716*** 
(.0515) 31 .55 
Labor 
-0.0917** 
(.0303) -9 .55 
-0.3052*** 
(.0646) -26 .41 
Eurozone 
Member 
0.4791*** 
(.0706) 62 .58 
0.4284*** 
(.0869) 54 .48 
Net Recipient 
-1.377*** 
(.1072) - .- 
0.2887* 
(.1158) - - 
Age 
-0.0296* 
(.0141) -3 - 
-0.0625** 
(.0188) -6 - 
Female 
-0.0600* 
(.0281) -6 - 
-0.01895 
(.0352) -2 - 
Overall - - .58 - - .48 
Number of obs 
LR chi2(20) 
Prob > chi2 
Log likelihood 
22570 
1322.21 
0.0000 
-14953.097 
 
  
14566 
(21)1160.94 
0.0000 
-9493.6012 
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Figure 4: EB Comparison of aggregate support for the EU Pre:1973-98 & Post:1999-2011 
 
 
 
Figure 5: EVS Comparison of aggregate support in EU Pre:1990-98 & Post:1999-2009 
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Figure 6: EB Predicted probability of integration support (EU membership a “good thing”) by predictor group 
 
 
 
Figure 7:  EVS Predicted probability of integration support (“quite a lot or a great deal” of confidence in EU) by 
predictor group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
AMERICAN EXCHANGE RATE PREFERENCES: 
Confirming or Casting Doubt on Exchange Rate Theory? 
 
 
The exchange rate is, arguably, the most influential element within an economy and within 
the greater international economic system (Broz & Frieden 2001).   The value of the 
exchange rate effectively determines consumer purchasing power, product pricing and the 
competitiveness of the labor market.  Given its implications for one’s personal economic 
situation, the dominant exchange rate frameworks hold individual preferences as a function 
of his or her orientation within the economy.  One’s economic orientation is primarily 
defined in terms of his or her sector of employment or factor endowment, i.e., capital or 
labor.  Alternative frameworks have also presented preferences as a product of the 
individual’s ideological affiliation or beliefs about the way the rate affects his or her nation 
as a whole.   
Despite the intellectual palatability of these theories, little, if any, empirical evidence 
underwrites them. Using data collected expressly for this study on the 2008 Polimetrix 
Survey, I empirically evaluate extant theoretical frameworks of individual exchange rate 
preferences.  I derive a set of testable hypotheses from the frameworks and evaluate them 
using a combination of experimental design techniques and logistic regression analysis.    
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I review the main theoretical accounts of individual 
exchange rate preferences and outline the hypotheses derived from the frameworks. Next, I 
introduce the research design, including a description of the survey 
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instrument and brief overview of experimental design methods. Finally, I discuss my 
findings, which produce minimal empirical support for the explanatory power of extant 
exchange rate preference frameworks.  
EXCHANGE RATE PREFERENCE THEORY  
The prevailing global exchange rate system has traditionally been used to define economic 
epochs/eras, e.g., Gold Standard Era, Bretton Woods, while within states the exchange rate 
effectively determines all other prices.  In the present era of international capital mobility, the 
exchange rate has become the primary mechanism through which governments can maintain 
some modicum of monetary autonomy (Mundell 1963, Flemming 1962).
32
  The first way a 
government can manipulate the exchange rate is through setting its level (high or low), the 
price at which the national currency trades in foreign exchange markets. The second involves 
the determination of exchange rate regime for extra-state transactions (fixed or floating). 
That is, whether the currency will be fixed against some other currency, float freely, or be a 
combination of the two (Broz & Frieden 2001).  
Several avenues of scholarship have developed around exchange rate matters, but the line 
most pertinent to this study seeks to explain individual and/or group preference holdings 
regarding the level and regime policy settings of the exchange rate.   Much like the research 
on trade protectionism preferences, these studies aim to identify what affiliations or 
characteristics drive societal exchange rate preferences (Frieden & Rogowski 1996; 
McKeown 1983; Scheve & Slaughter 1998; Hiscox 2002;  Oatley 1997, 2010).  
                                                             
32 The Mundell-Flemming model, presented independently by Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming, states that 
an economy cannot simultaneously maintain a fixed exchange rate, free capital movement, and an independent 
monetary policy. This principle is frequently called "the Unholy Trinity" or “Mundell Flemming Trilemma.” 
Mundell, Robert A. (1963). "Capital mobility and stabilization policy under fixed and flexible exchange rates" 
Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science 29 (4): 475–485; Fleming, J. Marcus (1962). "Domestic 
financial policies under fixed and floating exchange rates". IMF Staff Papers 9: 369–379. 
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A large share of research at the societal level, similar to trade preference theory, is predicated 
upon the significant distributional implications of the exchange rate, and thus holds 
individual preferences as a function of one’s particular orientation within the economy 
(Frieden 1991; Frieden & Rogowski 1996; Cleeland-Knight 2010).   Drawing from the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, factor-based explanations hold personal factor/skill endowments 
as the lines along which exchange rate preferences are forged. In terms of exchange rate 
level, those with a lower degree of factor endowments, assumed to be employed within labor-
intensive industries or manufacturing, favor a low exchange rate, as it makes products more 
competitive at home and abroad. In contrast, those with higher factor endowments, or 
employed within capital-intensive industries including professionals and 
executives/managers, prefer a high currency level which lowers the cost of living by yielding 
greater purchasing power.  
Much of the empirical work in this vein has developed out of the process of European 
monetary integration. Several research efforts have demonstrated personal factor 
endowments as the primary determinant of attitudes toward the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). Those of higher skills (factors), like professionals and executives, are more 
supportive of the EMU as it enhances consumer purchasing power.  Conversely, lower-
skilled individuals, including laborers and working class individuals, tend to be less 
supportive , as a result of the added occupational competition that regional economic 
liberalization introduced (Gabel 1998; Gabel & Whitten 1997; Gabel & Palmer 1995).   
Other than indirect verification of this framework using EMU attitudes as a proxy of actual 
exchange rate preferences, this framework has not been empirically evaluated directly.  
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Jeffry Frieden’s 1991 sector-based framework is generally considered the most established 
and accepted theory on exchange rate preferences.  Frieden draws from the Ricardo-Viner 
Theorem and contends that preferences on exchange rate regime and level vary according to 
the distributional outcomes across the sectors.
33
 He proposes that groups involved in foreign 
trade, finance and investment prefer a fixed rate, as it maintains stability and thereby 
promotes trade and investment.  In contrast, groups whose economic activity is limited to 
domestic transactions, including producers of non-tradable goods/services and import-
competing goods for the domestic market, should prefer a floating regime that enables the 
government to manage and stabilize domestic economic conditions.  In terms of level, 
import-competing firms and exporters often located within the manufacturing and other 
unionized sectors prefer a low exchange rate, as it makes their goods more competitive.  
Those within non-tradables, service sectors and investment prefer a higher-valued currency 
and its associated greater purchasing power.  
Unfortunately, the empirical legacy of Frieden’s framework is not as rich as its theoretical. 
Attempts to substantiate Frieden’s framework have been susceptible to charges of 
methodological inadequacy because of their small sample size and/or single case/country 
focus (Jonung 2004).  Arguably, its strongest methodological endorsement is the 2008 study 
by Broz, Frieden & Weymouth entitled "Exchange-Rate Policy Attitudes: Direct Evidence 
from Survey Data."  Using data from the 1999 World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES), which was administered to owners and managers of over 10,000 firms in 80 
countries, the authors find statistical support for the assumption that those within tradable 
                                                             
33
 The Ricardo-Viner Model, also known as the “specific factors model,” focuses on sectors rather than factors 
as the Heckscher-Olin model does.  R-V assumes a single specific factor in each industry and one mobile factor 
and extends the simple Ricardian Model by allowing the marginal product of labor to fall with output. 
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goods prefer exchange rate stability more than those oriented within import-competing and 
non-tradable sectors. Their results also suggest that tradable producers are more likely to be 
dissatisfied by an appreciation of the real exchange rate than those within non-tradable 
sectors like services and construction.  It is important to note, however, that the survey 
respondents were all owners or managers whose preferences are likely not representative of 
average employees and/or individuals.  Sarah Cleeland-Knight’s 2010 study featuring survey 
data from owners and workers at US firms, labor unions, trade and professional associations 
offered limited confirmation of Frieden’s framework.   
Ideological affiliation is another prominent mode of explaining exchange rate preferences 
within the literature. Much of this scholarship argues that right-leaning and conservative 
parties prefer a fixed, stable and higher-valued exchange rate, which helps to fulfill their 
constituents’ premium on financial stability and low inflation. Left-leaning parties, whose 
constituents traditionally include the working class and domestically oriented firms, prefer a 
flexible regime, which permits some degree of domestic monetary autonomy and more 
expansive fiscal policies within conditions of international capital mobility as well as a 
lesser-valued currency.    
Non-utility-based research, typically grounded in sociological rather than economic theory, 
stresses the need to incorporate factors such as identity, norms, and symbolism in the causal 
process of exchange rate preferences and note the infeasibility of assuming perfect 
information (Easton 1975; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Wendt 1999; Mansfield & Mutz 
2009; Abdelal, Blyth & Parsons 2010).  Such studies, according to David Easton’s 
“Institutional Evaluation Framework,” are premised upon the assumption that preferences are 
driven primarily by affective allegiances. In this case, exchange rate preferences are 
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derivatives of what the monetary institution “is or represents….not of what it does” (Easton 
1975). In other words, views on currency regimes and levels are not based on their 
implications for personal utility but on their perceived shared meaning or symbolism.  
According to the work of Inglehart, one of the foremost scholars within affectively-oriented 
scholarship, individuals with a higher “cognitive mobility” level, usually conceived of in 
terms of political awareness, involvement and communication skills, enables individuals to 
understand abstract concepts and processes such as the dynamics that exist among the 
exchange rate, consumer purchasing power and employment. (Inglehart, Rabier & Reif 1991; 
Janssen1991). Individuals with a high cognitive level should hold relatively consistent 
exchange rate preferences based not on its impact on personal utility, but on symbolic and 
collectively defined implications.  
In sum, extant theory provides several potential frameworks by which individuals form their 
preferences on the exchange rate.  For the purposes of this study, we focus on preferences 
regarding the exchange rate level or currency value.  I test the following hypotheses to 
determine which, if any, of the frameworks lends the most explanatory purchase.  
High Human Capital A high human capital level is taken to represent professionals and other 
higher-skilled occupations that are expected to prefer a higher-valued currency.  In keeping 
with much of the IPE research, Human Capital consists of individuals with a college degree 
or more and in the third or fourth income quartile.   
Hypothesis 1: The mean response of High Human Capital individuals should be higher 
(indicative of a preference for a higher-valued dollar) in all of the test groups than in the 
control and be positively associated with a higher-valued dollar in the logit model. 
 
56 
 
Labor Laborers, generally defined as those of lower human capital levels, are expected to 
prefer a lesser-valued currency.  In keeping with much of the IPE research, Labor consists of 
individuals with a high school diploma or less and in the first or second income quartile.   
Hypothesis 2: The mean response of Labor should be lower (indicative of a preference for a 
lesser-valued dollar) in all of the test groups than in the control and be negatively associated 
with a higher-valued dollar in the logit model. 
 
Union Union membership is most often associated with manufacturing and import-competing 
sectors, which are expected to prefer a lesser-valued currency.  I construct a dummy variable 
“Union” wherein 1 represents “union household” and 0 a “non-union household.”   
 
Hypothesis 3: The mean response of Union members should be lower in all of the test groups 
than in the control and be negatively associated with a higher valued dollar in the logit 
model. 
  
Ideology Right-leaning individuals or conservatives are expected to favor a higher-valued 
dollar, while left-leaning individuals or liberals should prefer a lesser-valued dollar.  I create 
two variables based on the respondent’s self-placement along the ideological spectrum: 
Conservatives and Liberals.   
Hypothesis 4: The mean response of Conservatives should be higher in all of the test groups 
than in the control and be positively associated with a higher-valued dollar in the logit 
model, while the mean response Liberals should be lower in all of the test groups and 
negatively associated with a higher-valued dollar in the logit model.  
 
High Cognitive Mobility Individuals with higher cognitive levels are theorized to be better 
equipped at processing abstract processes and regarded as an indicator of collectively defined 
preferences, not just material ones.  I operationalize the variable “High Cognitive Mobility” 
consistent with previous literature, combining an individual’s self-reported level of interest in 
“news and public affairs” and interest in “politics/current affairs.” 34 
                                                             
34
 Cognitive Mobility is operationalized by adding the responses of the following two questions: “What is your 
interest news and public affairs” (1) hardly any at all, (2) only now and then, (3) some of the time, (4) most of 
the time & “What is your level of interest in politics and current events?” (1) not much, (2) somewhat, (3) very 
much. Scores of 2-3 were coded as “1-low,” 4-5 as “2-mid,” and 6-7 “3-high” 
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Hypothesis 5- The mean response of High Cognitive Mobility level individuals should be 
lower in all of the test groups than in the control, and negatively associated with a higher-
valued dollar in the logit models. 
 
High Market IQ I also evaluate the results of individuals who classified themselves as having 
a high Market IQ, or understanding of markets and finances.
35
  Presumably these individuals 
should understand the dynamics among the currency value, employment and consumer 
prices.  These individuals should have consistent preferences across the groups, but based on 
theory, we do not have expectations of the direction of the relationship. 
Hypothesis 5- The mean response of individuals with a High Market IQ should be consistent 
across the control and test groups, as well as the logit models. 
 
High Education I also evaluate the responses of individuals who have attained a four-year 
college degree or more.  Previous experimental research suggests that educated individuals 
are more adept at interpreting the substantive issue being surveyed regardless of changes in 
the way that the question is framed (Chong & Druckman 2007; Tilley & Hobolt 2011).  The 
responses of educated individuals should be consistent regardless of slight framing 
differences. 
Hypothesis 6: The mean response of High Educated individuals should be consistent within 
test group IV, which received both of the treatment questions (Questions II & III). 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN  
Survey Instrument  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
     An alternate coding of Cognitive Mobility was also included in the models, but did not change the direction 
or significance of results.  The alternate coding is as follows: 1- High school diploma or less & political interest 
‘not much’; 2-  High school diploma or less & political interest ‘somewhat,’ Some college or associate degree 
& political interest ‘not much;’ 3- High school diploma or less & political interest ‘very much,’ Some college or 
associate degree & political interest ‘somewhat,’ College degree or more & political interest ‘not much;’ 4- 
Some college or associate degree & political interest ‘very much,” College degree or more & political interest 
‘somewhat;’ 5- College degree or more & political interest ‘very much.’ 
 
35
 This group consists of respondents reporting themselves as having either an “excellent” or “good” 
understanding of financial markets.  
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This paper features original data from the Fall 2008 Polimetrix Cooperative Congressional 
Election Study (CCES) public opinion survey, coordinated by Dr. Stephen Ansolabehere of 
Harvard.
36
 The 2008 CCES involved 30 research teams that each contained a 1000-person 
national sample. Administered online during October and November of 2008, the survey 
instrument was thirty minutes long and included 120 questions. For each 1000-person survey, 
half of the questionnaire was developed entirely by the team’s researchers, while the other 
half featured “Common Content” questions that appeared on all 30 surveys and mainly 
concerned demographic factors such as educational background, income, race and ideology. 
My battery of questions was featured within the UNC-Duke team survey, directed by Dr. 
Thomas Carsey.  The survey consists of respondents from an opt-in pool, which was then 
converted into a representative sample by a process of matching characteristics of a random, 
representative sample of American adults.   
The CCES respondents were assigned to one of four possible groups. Group I is considered 
the control group and received question I below, which contained no additional information 
on the implications of a higher-or lesser-valued dollar. Test group II received question II, 
which included information detailing the associated effects of a higher-or lesser-valued dollar 
(i.e., the treatment). Test group III received treatment question III, which framed the issue in 
terms of situations associated with either a higher or lesser dollar, without explicitly stating 
the connection. Finally, test group IV received both of the treatment questions (II & III), the 
responses of which will be noted as IVa and IVb, respectively. In order to compare the means 
of the control and test groups, I harmonize the responses, coding them in terms of either (1) 
                                                             
36
 "CCES Common Content, 2008" <ahref="http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/14003">hdl:1902.1/14003</a> 
V4[Version] 
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lesser-valued dollar or (2) higher-valued.
37
  Table 9 features the means for all relevant groups 
within the study.  
I. The following question concerns your preference on currency valuations.  Please read 
the prompt and indicate your top preference among the choices listed. 
Which of the following currency value situations do you most prefer? 
___the US dollar having a higher value relative to other national currencies 
___the US dollar having a lesser value relative to other national currencies  
___no preference 
 
II. The following question concerns your preference on currency valuations.  Listed is a 
generalization of effects associated with a higher or lesser dollar value relative to other 
currencies.  Please indicate which you prefer: 
 
Higher-valued: cheaper prices on foreign products (e.g., gas, food, apparel, automobiles); 
cheaper prices when traveling abroad; US manufacturers sell less abroad and at home; job 
losses in lower-skilled and/or export sectors (e.g., manufacturing, textiles, auto, furniture) 
 
Lesser-valued: U.S. manufacturers sell more products abroad and at home; job gains within 
lower-skilled and/or export sectors (e.g., manufacturing, textiles, auto, furniture); higher 
prices on foreign products (e.g., gas, food, apparel, automobiles); higher cost of living due to 
higher prices. 
 
___the US dollar having a higher value relative to other national currencies 
___the US dollar having a lesser value relative to other national currencies  
___no preference 
 
III. The following question concerns your preference on currency valuations. Which of 
the following two situations do you prefer: 
___Cheaper consumer goods (e.g., gas, food, apparel, automobiles) but greater risk of job 
loss within lower-skilled and/or export sectors (e.g., jobs within manufacturing, textiles, auto 
industries) 
or 
___More expensive consumer goods (e.g., gas, food, apparel, automobiles) but greater job 
security within lower-skilled and/or export sectors (e.g., jobs within manufacturing, textiles, 
auto industries). 
 
Experimental Design  
Though experimental design traditionally has enjoyed a stronger presence in psychological 
and behavioral economic research, it is gaining ground within political science largely 
                                                             
37
 I do not include “no preference/don’t know” responses within the mean calculations or the formulation of the 
dependent variables in our logit model, but they are included within the percentage figures. 
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because of this method’s ability to clarify causal relationships that are difficult to gauge using 
other means of inference (Druckman, Green, Kuklinski, & Lupia 2011). According to 
economist Alvin Roth, experimental research can be used to uncover facts, scrutinize theory, 
adjudicate theoretical disputes and/or “whisper in the ears of princes,” i.e., provide relevant 
information to policy makers and politicians. Experimental design research has made a 
number of significant contributions to scholarship. Laboratory researchers have explored 
topics ranging from the effects of media exposure to the conditions under which groups solve 
collective action problems (Iyengar & Kinder 1987; Ostrom, Walker & Gardner 1992). 
Others have used it to identify empirical anomalies that produced new theoretical insights or 
to evaluate the ways in which framing, information, and decision cues influence voters’ 
policy preferences and support for public officials (McKelvey & Palfrey 1992; Druckman 
2004; Tomz 2007).  
In short, experiments allow us to evaluate a causal question through the comparison of two 
states of the world, “one in which some sort of intervention is administered (a treated state, 
i.e., exposing a subject to a stimulus/treatment) and another in which it is not (an untreated 
state)” (Sniderman 2011). Survey experimental research, like this study, involves an 
intervention in the course of an opinion survey. This approach enables researchers to present 
a large and representative sample of people with a broad range of different stimuli in a 
context that makes it easy to gather detailed outcome measures (Sniderman 2011). One can 
then use these measures to estimate the average effect of the treatment by calculating the 
difference between the sample mean of the treatment group and the control group.  
The formal logic underlying experimental research is often presented in notational form, 
which comes from the work of mathematicians Jerzy Neyman (1923) and Donald Rubin 
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(1974). The Neymin-Rubin causal model states that for each individual “I,” Y0 represents the 
outcome if i is not exposed to the treatment, and Y1 is the outcome if i is exposed to the 
treatment.  
The treatment effect is thus defined as: (1) τi = Yi1 – Yi0.  
We can then extend this logic to a set of individuals, where the average treatment effect 
(ATE) is the following: ATE = E(τi)= E(Yi1) – E(Yi0).38  
We can consider this estimate unbiased as long as participants were randomly assigned to 
groups, where the potential effect of participants’ demographic or other features are balanced 
out by the covariate balance property.  The treatment, i.e., information on the associated 
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 Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science: Neyman-Rubin Causal Model 
By: James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia 
“The logic underlying randomized experiments is often explicated in terms of a notational system that has its 
origins in Neyman (1923) and Rubin (1974). For each individual i let Y0 be the outcome if i is not exposed to 
the treatment, and Y1 be the outcome if i is exposed to the treatment. The treatment effect is defined as: 
(1) τi = Yi1 – Yi0. 
Extending this logic to a set of individuals, we may define the average treatment effect (ATE) as follows: 
(2) ATE = E(τi)= E(Yi1 )– E(Yi0). 
Implicitly the treatment effect may vary across individuals. Stated formally, the concept of the average 
treatment effect among the treated may be written: 
(3) ATT = E(τi|Ti=1)= E(Yi1|Ti=1) - E(Yi0|Ti=1), where Ti=1 when a person receives a treatment.  
To clarify the terminology, Yi1|Ti=1 is the outcome resulting from the treatment among those who are actually 
treated, whereas Yi0|Ti=1 is the outcome that would have been observed in the absence of treatment among 
those who are actually treated. Comparing equations (2) and (3), the average treatment effect need not be the 
same as the treatment effect among the treated. This framework can be used to show the importance of random 
assignment. When treatments are randomly administered, the group that receives the treatment (Ti=1) has the 
same expected outcome as the group that does not receive the treatment (Ti=0) would if it were treated: 
(4) E(Yi1|Ti=1) = E(Yi1|Ti=0) 
Similarly, the group that does not receive the treatment has the same expected outcome, if untreated, as the 
group that receives the treatment, if it were untreated: 
(5) E(Yi0|Ti=0) = E(Yi0|Ti=1) 
Equations (4) and (5) are termed the independence assumption by Holland (1986) because the randomly 
assigned value of Ti conveys no information about the potential values of Yi. Equations (2), (4), and (5) imply 
that the average treatment effect may be written: 
(6) ATE = E(τi) = E(Yi1|Ti=1) – E(Yi0|Ti=0). 
Because E(Yi1|Ti=1) and E(Yi0|Ti=0) may be estimated directly from the data, this equation suggests a solution 
to the problem of causal inference. Random assignment further implies that independence will hold not only for 
Yi, but for any variable Xi that might be measured prior to the administration of the treatment. The average 
value of Xi in  the treatment group can be assumed the same as the control group.  The entire distribution of Xi 
is expected to be the same across experimental groups. This property is known as covariate balance. 
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economic implications of the currency value, should lead individual preferences to fall in line 
with extant theoretical predictions. 
Statistical Analysis 
I supplement the findings of the experimental research design with statistical testing.  I use 
logistic regression analysis with robust standard errors to detect any significant patterns of 
preference alignments and determine which, if any, of existing exchange rate frameworks has 
the greatest degree of explanatory purchase. Table 8 features the results from the six 
statistical models. 
Dependent Variables: I use the results from the three questions listed above as the dependent 
variables in three separate statistical models. 
 Models 1 & 4 - Simple Currency- (0) Lesser-valued dollar or (1) Higher   
 Models 2 & 5 - Currency with Information - (0) Lesser-valued dollar or (1) Higher 
Models 3 & 6 - Currency Situation - (0) Job Security/Lesser-valued dollar or (1) Cheaper 
Goods/Higher 
 
Controls:  I also include a number of control variables commonly included within the 
literature.  Age consists of three groups where 18-34-year-olds are coded as 1, 35-54 as 2 and 
55-and-up as 3.  Gender is a dummy variable where 0 is male and 1 female.  
ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION 
While failing to show that the intervening treatment had the anticipated impact would usually 
render an experiment a failure, in this case the absence of expected changes perhaps makes 
this a more interesting study.  Indeed, the study provides minimal support for extant 
exchange rate preference theories’ predictions.  The results of the statistical tests, presented 
in Table 8, corroborate the experimental design findings.  None of the explanatory variables 
achieve statistical significance in any of the models.  High Human Capital, Labor, Union, 
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Conservatives, Liberals, High Cognitive Mobility, High Market IQ and High Education all 
failed to achieve statistical significance in any of the models.
39
  In fact, the only variable to 
achieve statistical significance is the Age control variable, which is negatively associated 
with a higher-valued dollar in models 3 and 6.  
The information treatment question, which explicitly stated the economic implications of a 
higher- and lesser-valued dollar, essentially had a negligible impact on respondent choices.  
The difference in means between the control group and test group II (Figure 8) is less than a 
tenth of a point (.93 and .84 respectively).
40
   As figure 8 illustrates, proportions between the 
control group and test group II were highly consistent.  The majority in both groups preferred 
a higher value, with 75% in the control and 69% in test group II.  Only 5% favored a lesser-
valued currency in the control and just slightly more preferred this value in the test group 
(13%).   A similar share of individuals had “no preference” in both groups (19% and 20%, 
respectively).  Comparison of the control group to that of individuals in test group IV, who 
were given the same information treatment question as test group II, produced strikingly 
similar results.  The mean response was also .84, and around 70% of individuals in test group 
IV preferred a higher-valued dollar, 20% had no preference and just 10% favored a lesser-
dollar value. 
The difference in mean response between the control group and test group III, which 
received the treatment that did not explicitly connect the dollar value to the situations 
provided, is larger.  The mean within this test group drops to .42, five-tenths of a point lower 
                                                             
39  Though the small size of some of the subpopulations, e.g., union, could potentially explain their failure to 
achieve statistical significance within the logit model, variation in currency value preferences according to 
groups should be reflected in the proportional analysis of responses. 
40
 One-way analysis of variance tests does not produce significantly different means between the control and 
treatment groups II and IVa.   These tests did show a significant difference in the means of the control and test 
groups III and IVb.  Among the treatment groups which should be consistent, there is a significant difference of 
means between groups II and III, II and IVb, III and IVa, IVa and IVb. 
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than the control mean.  The majority of respondents in this group answered in the opposite 
manner as the control group and test group II, with 58% preferring the situation associated 
with a lesser dollar value and only 42% the higher level.  The proportion of responses of 
those within test group IV, which received the situational treatment, is similar to that of test 
group III, with a mean response of .46 and the majority (54%) preferring the situation 
associated with a lesser-dollar value.   
The mean responses across the test groups varied according to the treatment framing, 
indicating that individuals may not have a strong understanding of the connection between 
the currency value, employment and consumer purchasing power.  The figures from test 
group IV provide the most compelling evidence of this fact.   Test group IV’s mean response 
to the two treatment questions diverged significantly, with the majority of individuals 
preferring the higher value in the informational question and a lesser value in the situational 
treatment.  The vast majority of group IV’s respondents (70%) provided contradictory 
responses to these two questions.   
The data provide even less support for our second set of hypotheses derived from exchange 
rate preference theory.  High Human Capital (HHC), typically used as a proxy for 
professionals and other highly skilled occupations, is theorized to be associated with a 
preference for a higher currency value, as purchasing power does not come at the loss of job 
security for this group.  Our experiment, however, fails to provide any evidence to support 
this hypothesis.  The mean response of the test groups should be greater than that of the 
control group or at least not drop below it.  Among those who received the informational 
treatment question, the mean response dropped from .94 in the control group to .83 in test 
group II and .64 in group IV, with the majority preferring a higher value only by 50% and 
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61%, respectively (Figure 12).  Likewise, the mean for the situational treatment decreases to 
.22 in group III and .44 in group IV and the majority of HHC individuals switch to a 
preference for a lesser value. 
Labor and Union workers, who are most often affiliated with manufacturing and import-
competing sectors, are expected to prefer a lower currency value.  The experiment produces 
little evidence that either group actually holds preferences for a lesser-valued dollar.  The 
difference in mean response of Union members who received the informational treatment 
question dropped less than one-tenth of a point, from .90 in the control group to .86 in test 
group II (Figure 2.2).  The percentage of Union members given the informational treatment 
preferring a lesser-valued dollar increased slightly from 8% in the control to 11% in test 
group II.  Similarly Labor’s mean response in test group II fell slightly to .83 from .92 in the 
control case, and the percentage support for a lesser value moved from 8% in the control to 
17% in group II.  Union and Labor’s mean response to the situational treatment also followed 
the basic pattern of the overall population, decreasing to around .4 in test groups III and IVb.  
Again we find that the majority of Union members prefer a lesser-valued dollar when given 
the situational treatment by around 60%, while the bare majority of Labor does so at around 
51%.  The same contradictory preferences are given by Union and Labor in test group IV, 
and somewhat surprisingly, the mean responses of these groups are actually higher than their 
HHC counterparts across the test groups.    
The survey results also fail to validate our expectations regarding ideological affiliation’s 
impact on exchange rate level preferences.  Liberals and Conservatives followed the same 
general trend of means across the groups (Figure 13).  The control means for Conservatives 
and Liberals were .94 and .95, respectively, and both minimally decrease to .8 given the 
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informational treatment.   The situational treatment produces a more pronounced difference 
in the means of both ideological groups, falling to .4 among Conservatives and.3 among 
Liberals. The majority of Conservatives and Liberals remained consistent with the overall 
population, preferring a higher value with informational treatment, a lesser value in the 
situational treatment context and displaying contradictory preferences within test group IV. 
The anticipated impact of a High Cognitive Mobility level on preferences is also not 
demonstrated within the experiment.  The responses individuals of High Cognitive Mobility 
are not distinguishable from the general trend of the population.  The High Cognitive 
Mobility control group’s mean of .96 decreases to .84 given the information treatment, while 
falling further to around .4 in the situational context (Figure 14).  Again we find a familiar 
proportional breakdown with the majority of High Cognitive Mobility individuals displaying 
opposite preferences in the informational and situational contexts. 
Finally, the two groups expected to hold consistent views, High Education and High Market 
IQ, proved no exception to the norm of conflicting preferences (Figure 14). The control 
means of these two groups minimally decreased from .9 to .8 when provided with the 
informational treatment but dropped rather significantly when provided with the situational 
to around .4.   High Education respondents, who previous studies have proven to be better 
equipped at processing framing differences, failed to draw a connection between the 
treatments, with the majority preferring opposite levels in the informational and situational.  
Likewise, individuals who described themselves as having a strong understanding of 
financial markets failed to prove so, with 74% preferring a higher value in the informational 
and 66% preferring a lower value in the situational context.   
67 
 
Perhaps the most striking observation that can be drawn from the experiment is the 
consistency of inconsistency among the groups.  The means and proportional breakdown of 
the overall population is mirrored by each of our predictive groups.  The majority of each of 
the predictive groups preferred a higher dollar in response to the informational treatment and 
a lesser-valued one in the situational context, and none of our predictive groups provided 
consistent responses in test group IV.  That the highly educated did not provide consistent 
responses in group IV suggests that the conflicting preferences displayed generally in this 
experiment are not merely a product of framing, but of a fundamentally unsound 
understanding of monetary relationships.   Changes in the framing of the discussion seem to 
overcome American exchange rate views rather easily.  The results from this study paint a 
picture of individual preferences that are far from the ordered, stable set depicted in our 
theories. 
CONCLUSION 
This study accomplished all three of Roth’s experimental objectives.  It uncovered unknown 
facts and patterns highlighting the inconsistent or unknown preferences of Americans 
concerning the exchange rate, which could be of relevance to “princes” or policy makers.  
The findings of this experiment convey a strong message about the strength and reliability of 
extant exchange rate theory.  Indeed, our experiment and statistical tests were not able to 
produce empirical support for any of the extant theoretical accounts of exchange rate 
preferences.   Unless this is a case of American “exceptionalism,” it appears that our theories 
need more empirical testing in order to establish their generalizability and robustness.   
This study also suggests that monetary issues represent one area where Americans have not 
been able to access and develop coherent and consistent opinions, as the average individual 
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holds what appears to be a tenuous grasp of monetary dynamics or the implications that the 
currency value has on employment and consumer purchasing power.  Clearly there is a 
strong need for more research exploring the potential impediments to this issue area.  This 
study will hopefully pave the way for more research on American public opinion of 
monetary-related matters to uncover the underlying factors and/or reasons why the exchange 
rate seems to be the one issue about which Americans lack an opinion.  
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Figure 8: Control Group versus Test Group II       Figure 9: Control Group versus Test Group III 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Test Groups II & IV         Figure  11  Test Groups III & IV 
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Table 8: Logistic Regression with robust standard errors in parentheses; **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
Predictors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model4 Model 5  Model 6 
DV Simple  Information Situation Simple Information Situation 
High Human 
Capital 
-.6483 
(.9813) 
-.2477 
(.3784) 
.1716 
(.3141) 
- - - 
Labor -.2346 
(.9950) 
.1353 
(.3582) 
.1974 
(.2274) 
- - - 
Union -.5919 
(.8318) 
-.1090 
(.3185) 
-.1749 
(.2191) 
-.6169 
(.7191) 
-.1097 
(.3187) 
-.2103 
(.2191) 
Conservative -.5443 
(.8519) 
.3440 
(.3212) 
-.0315 
(.2192) 
-.4711 
(.8922) 
.3460 
(.3219) 
-.0474 
(.2185) 
Liberal .3058 
(1.131) 
.1487 
(.3861) 
-.5852 
(.2669) 
.3167 
(1.151) 
.1573 
(.3848) 
-.5967 
(.2661) 
High 
Cognitive 
Mobility 
1.654 
(.8094) 
.2569 
(.3139) 
-.1588 
(.2214) 
1.606 
(.7685) 
.2622 
(.3203) 
-.1924 
(.2161) 
High Market 
IQ 
-2.002 
(1.509) 
.2048 
(.3189) 
.0833 
(.2075) 
-1.978 
(1.390) 
.1978 
(.3115) 
.0966 
(.2063) 
High 
Education 
- - - -.3339 
(.7744) 
-.3038 
(.3140) 
-.1501 
(.2190) 
Female .2261 
(.6544) 
-.0742 
(.2853) 
-.0470 
(.2021) 
.1540 
(.8005) 
-.0843 
(.2886) 
-.0524 
(.2017) 
Age .4497 
(.5221) 
-.3069 
(.2210) 
-.3520* 
(.1484) 
.4816 
(.5094) 
-.3041 
(.2171) 
-.3241* 
(.1461) 
cons 2.799 
(2.242) 
2.016* 
(.7291) 
.6638 
(.5025) 
2.739 
(2.152) 
2.113* 
(.7418) 
.7646 
(.4959) 
Obs 
Wald chi2 
Prob > chi2 
174 
(19) 15.30 
0.0830 
371 
(9) 4.37 
0.8851 
461 
(9) 15.52 
.0776 
174 
(8) 12.95 
.1135 
371 
(8) 4,18 
.8404 
461 
(8) 14.96 
.0599 
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 Table 9: Mean Results from Survey Experiment 
Predictors 
Control 
Group 
Test 2 
Information 
Treatment 
Test 3 
Situation 
Treatment 
Test 4A 
Information 
Treatment 
Test 4B 
Situation 
Treatment 
Overall group .93 .84 .42*** .84 .46*** 
High Human Capital .93 .83 .22*** .67* .44*** 
Labor .92 .83         .49*** .87 .46 
Union .90 .86        .39*** .79* .41*** 
Conservative .94 .86 .45*** .85 .43*** 
Liberal .95 .78* .28*** .88 .37*** 
High Cognitive 
Mobility 
.95 .84* .33*** .84 .43*** 
High Market IQ .92 .84* .43*** .84 .44*** 
High Education .94            .82* .29*** .80 .46*** 
Entries are group means. All variables coded on a 0–1 scale. Larger value (1) for higher-valued currency 
preference.  P-values represent difference of mean significance level of groups in the test versus control cases 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.000 
 
Figure 12  High Human Capital, Labor and Union Means by Group 
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Figure 13 Conservative and Liberal Means by Group 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Means Consistency of Cognitive, Market IQ and High Education across Groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1.1 Table 1 Model 1: With Cognitive, Political Mobility separated into education & political discussion, 
with year dummy coefficients. 
DV: Membership Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
POSTMATERIALISM .0648485 .0063094 10.28 0.000 .0524823 .0772146 
POLITICAL 
DISCUSSION 
.1233268 .0040353 30.56 0.000 .1154176 .1312359 
EDUCATION .2758152 .0060563 45.54 0.000 .2639451 .2876854 
PROFESSIONAL/ 
EXECUTIVES 
.3962907 .0204361 19.39 0.000 .3562366 .4363447 
LABOR -.3046572 .0106956 -28.48 0.000 -.3256202 -.2836941 
IDEOLOGY .2451294 .0051567 47.54 0.000 .2350225 .2552363 
NET CONTRIBUTOR .0834538 .0106787 7.82 0.000 .062524 .1043836 
EUROZONE 
MEMEBR 
1.109876 .0111356 99.67 0.000 1.08805 1.131701 
AGE SEGMENT 40-
54 
.0052552 .0108816 0.48 0.629 -.0160723 .0265827 
 25-39 -.0308768 .0107892 -2.86 0.004 -.0520232 -.0097304 
  15-24 .0587522 .0123 4.78 0.000 .0346447 .0828598 
FEMALE -.2300946 .0079312 -29.01 0.000 -.2456395 -.2145497 
_Iyear_1976 -.2081609 .0370805 -5.61 0.000 -.2808374 -.1354844 
_Iyear_1977 -.0969542 .032756 -2.96 0.003 -.1611548 -.0327536 
_Iyear_1978 -.0603853 .0329291 -1.83 0.067 -.1249251 .0041546 
_Iyear_1980 -.3037472 .0323335 -9.39 0.000 -.3671196 -.2403748 
_Iyear_1981 -.4560222 .0319461 -14.27 0.000 -.5186353 -.3934091 
_Iyear_1982 -.4383558 .0321207 -13.65 0.000 -.5013113 -.3754004 
_Iyear_1983 -.265606 .0320817 -8.28 0.000 -.3284851 -.202727 
_Iyear_1984 -.2741372 .0319486 -8.58 0.000 -.3367553 -.2115191 
_Iyear_1985 -.1637007 .0316651 -5.17 0.000 -.2257632 -.1016382 
_Iyear_1986 .1069752 .0317578 3.37 0.001 .0447309 .1692194 
_Iyear_1987 .1169478 .0318892 3.67 0.000 .0544461 .1794495 
_Iyear_1988 .0624946 .0317613 1.97 0.049 .0002437 .1247456 
_Iyear_1989 .2607391 .0297208 8.77 0.000 .2024875 .3189907 
_Iyear_1990 .3125626 .0320141 9.76 0.000 .2498161 .375309 
_Iyear_1991 .4557401 .030401 14.99 0.000 .3961552 .5153249 
_Iyear_1992 .0639575 .0311486 2.05 0.040 .0029074 .1250075 
_Iyear_1993 -.1683455 .0308291 -5.46 0.000 -.2287695 -.1079215 
_Iyear_1997 -.5859171 .0332826 -17.60 0.000 -.6511497 -.5206844 
_Iyear_2005 -.5095835 .0331468 -15.37 0.000 -.57455 -.444617 
_Iyear_2008 -.4383789 .0332515 -13.18 0.000 -.5035506 -.3732071 
_cons -1.276954 .0384353 -33.22 0.000 -1.352286 -1.201622 
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Figure 1.2 Table 1 Model 1: Micro Model with year dummy coefficients 
memdic Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
POSTMATERIALISM .0648073 .006311 10.27 0.000 .0524379 .0771767 
COGNITIVE SKILLS 
2 
.095041 .015162 6.27 0.000 .0653241 .124758 
  3 .2538115 .0147015 17.26 0.000 .2249971 .282626 
  4 .3871689 .0158408 24.44 0.000 .3561216 .4182163 
  5 .4902638 .0194308 25.23 0.000 .4521801 .5283475 
  6 .4702256 .0282298 16.66 0.000 .4148961 .525555 
EDUCATION .1610774 .0077025 20.91 0.000 .1459808 .1761739 
PROFESSIONAL/ 
EXECUTIVES 
.4042014 .0204719 19.74 0.000 .3640773 .4443255 
LABOR -.3043019 .010701 -28.44 0.000 -.3252755 -.2833284 
IDEOLOGY .2444379 .0051589 47.38 0.000 .2343266 .2545491 
NET CONTRIBUTOR .0812384 .0106848 7.60 0.000 .0602966 .1021803 
EUROZONE 
MEMEBR 
1.107355 .0111485 99.33 0.000 1.085504 1.129206 
FEMALE -.2303741 .0079324 -29.04 0.000 -.2459213 -.2148269 
AGE SEGMENT 40-
54 
.0031914 .0108936 0.29 0.770 -.0181597 .0245425 
 25-39 -.0350479 .0108195 -3.24 0.001 -.0562537 -.0138421 
  15-24 .0484902 .0124261 3.90 0.000 .0241355 .0728448 
_Iyear_1976 -.2084021 .0370911 -5.62 0.000 -.2810992 -.135705 
_Iyear_1977 -.09759 .0327642 -2.98 0.003 -.1618067 -.0333733 
_Iyear_1978 -.0614124 .0329368 -1.86 0.062 -.1259673 .0031424 
_Iyear_1980 -.3046432 .0323406 -9.42 0.000 -.3680295 -.2412568 
_Iyear_1981 -.4563978 .0319534 -14.28 0.000 -.5190252 -.3937704 
_Iyear_1982 -.4401051 .0321293 -13.70 0.000 -.5030774 -.3771329 
_Iyear_1983 -.2673742 .0320905 -8.33 0.000 -.3302705 -.204478 
_Iyear_1984 -.2749851 .0319559 -8.61 0.000 -.3376176 -.2123526 
_Iyear_1985 -.1651987 .0316731 -5.22 0.000 -.2272768 -.1031205 
_Iyear_1986 .1052366 .0317654 3.31 0.001 .0429775 .1674957 
_Iyear_1987 .1147688 .0318976 3.60 0.000 .0522507 .1772868 
_Iyear_1988 .06047 .0317692 1.90 0.057 -.0017965 .1227365 
_Iyear_1989 .2587482 .0297286 8.70 0.000 .2004813 .3170151 
_Iyear_1990 .3113885 .0320203 9.72 0.000 .2486298 .3741471 
_Iyear_1991 .454035 .0304081 14.93 0.000 .3944364 .5136337 
_Iyear_1992 .0622197 .0311554 2.00 0.046 .0011563 .1232831 
_Iyear_1993 -.1707691 .0308372 -5.54 0.000 -.2312088 -.1103293 
_Iyear_1997 -.5896075 .0332951 -17.71 0.000 -.6548647 -.5243502 
_Iyear_2005 -.5137185 .0331594 -15.49 0.000 -.5787097 -.4487274 
_Iyear_2008 -.442128 .0332649 -13.29 0.000 -.5073261 -.37693 
_cons -1.031326 .0385156 -26.78 0.000 -1.106815 -.9558372 
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Figure 1.3 Table 2, Model 2: Meso featuring postwar cohort and year dummy coefficients 
memdichot Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
POSTWAR COHORT .0200877 .0062966 3.19 0.001 .0077466 .0324288 
1932-1944 Cohort -.023057 .0090659 -2.54 0.011 -.0408258 -.0052882 
COGNITIVE SKILLS 2 .1217778 .0114304 10.65 0.000 .0993746 .144181 
  3 .2954424 .0111185 26.57 0.000 .2736504 .3172343 
  4 .4650303 .0117934 39.43 0.000 .4419156 .4881449 
  5 .5904917 .0139381 42.37 0.000 .5631736 .6178098 
  6 .593472 .0193179 30.72 0.000 .5556097 .6313344 
EDUCATION .2049452 .0052614 38.95 0.000 .194633 .2152573 
PROFESSIONAL/ 
EXECUTIVES 
.3511242 .0144783 24.25 0.000 .3227472 .3795011 
LABOR -.3292337 .007703 -42.74 0.000 -.3443313 -.3141361 
IDEOLOGY .1412184 .0035372 39.92 0.000 .1342855 .1481512 
NET CONTRIBUTOR -.3190053 .0079934 -39.91 0.000 -.3346721 -.3033385 
EUROZONE MEMEBR .7640005 .0081952 93.23 0.000 .7479383 .7800628 
FEMALE -.2636025 .0054713 -48.18 0.000 -.274326 -.2528789 
_Iyear_1976 .0657406 .0371952 1.77 0.077 -.0071607 .1386419 
_Iyear_1977 .1730344 .0373123 4.64 0.000 .0999037 .2461651 
_Iyear_1978 .2382806 .0375402 6.35 0.000 .1647032 .311858 
_Iyear_1979 .2853818 .0373554 7.64 0.000 .2121665 .3585971 
_Iyear_1980 -.0405526 .0368054 -1.10 0.271 -.1126899 .0315847 
_Iyear_1981 -.2185204 .0362896 -6.02 0.000 -.2896468 -.147394 
_Iyear_1982 -.1749393 .0364748 -4.80 0.000 -.2464286 -.1034499 
_Iyear_1983 -.0018112 .0364247 -0.05 0.960 -.0732023 .0695799 
_Iyear_1984 -.0298052 .0362177 -0.82 0.411 -.1007905 .0411802 
_Iyear_1985 .0977146 .0348912 2.80 0.005 .0293291 .1661001 
_Iyear_1986 .351539 .034938 10.06 0.000 .2830617 .4200163 
_Iyear_1987 .3557083 .0350134 10.16 0.000 .2870833 .4243332 
_Iyear_1988 .3012997 .0348961 8.63 0.000 .2329046 .3696948 
_Iyear_1989 .5090399 .0330992 15.38 0.000 .4441666 .5739133 
_Iyear_1990 .5509888 .0350612 15.72 0.000 .48227 .6197075 
_Iyear_1991 .7083017 .0336737 21.03 0.000 .6423023 .774301 
_Iyear_1992 .2934091 .0331708 8.85 0.000 .2283956 .3584226 
_Iyear_1993 .0826836 .0340337 2.43 0.015 .0159787 .1493885 
_Iyear_1995 -.2380798 .0358145 -6.65 0.000 -.3082749 -.1678847 
_Iyear_1996 -.3265198 .0325656 -10.03 0.000 -.3903472 -.2626923 
_Iyear_1997 -.2898005 .0321422 -9.02 0.000 -.3527981 -.2268029 
_Iyear_1998 -.0708409 .0335712 -2.11 0.035 -.1366392 -.0050427 
_Iyear_1999 -.021525 .0364755 -0.59 0.555 -.0930156 .0499656 
_Iyear_2000 -.1230999 .0337143 -3.65 0.000 -.1891788 -.0570211 
_Iyear_2001 -.0999157 .0337738 -2.96 0.003 -.1661111 -.0337203 
_Iyear_2002 .0103152 .0337353 0.31 0.760 -.0558047 .0764352 
_Iyear_2003 -.1042021 .0336749 -3.09 0.002 -.1702036 -.0382005 
_Iyear_2004 .0628214 .0363978 1.73 0.084 -.008517 .1341599 
_Iyear_2005 -.1552879 .0335663 -4.63 0.000 -.2210767 -.0894992 
_Iyear_2006 -.2182884 .0326894 -6.68 0.000 -.2823584 -.1542184 
_Iyear_2007 .0148829 .033644 0.44 0.658 -.0510581 .0808238 
_Iyear_2008 -.1488478 .0336168 -4.43 0.000 -.2147355 -.0829602 
_cons -.5277992 .035748 -14.76 0.000 -.5978639 -.4577344 
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Figure 1.4 Table 2, Model 3: Meso featuring post 1975 cohort and year dummy coefficients 
memdic Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
POST 1975 COHORT .3898356 .0134538 28.98 0.000 .3634668 .4162045 
COGNITIVE SKILLS 2 .1212424 .0107616 11.27 0.000 .10015 .1423348 
  3 .2861286 .0104405 27.41 0.000 .2656657 .3065915 
  4 .4520272 .0110887 40.76 0.000 .4302938 .4737607 
  5 .5727591 .0132599 43.19 0.000 .5467702 .598748 
  6 .5757627 .0187048 30.78 0.000 .5391018 .6124235 
EDUCATION .2181716 .0050023 43.61 0.000 .2083672 .227976 
PROF/EXECS .3664336 .0137884 26.58 0.000 .3394089 .3934582 
LABOR -.3212872 .0072043 -44.60 0.000 -.3354073 -.3071671 
IDEOLOGY .1444227 .0033899 42.60 0.000 .1377785 .1510668 
NET CONTRIBUTOR -.2900697 .0078202 -37.09 0.000 -.305397 -.2747424 
EUROZONE MEMEBR .7656667 .0080175 95.50 0.000 .7499527 .7813807 
FEMALE -.26011 .005249 -49.55 0.000 -.2703979 -.2498221 
_Iyear_1976 .0851777 .0357293 2.38 0.017 .0151497 .1552058 
_Iyear_1977 .1984149 .0358495 5.53 0.000 .1281511 .2686786 
_Iyear_1978 .2374892 .0360008 6.60 0.000 .1669289 .3080496 
_Iyear_1979 .3037593 .0359604 8.45 0.000 .2332783 .3742404 
_Iyear_1980 -.0216606 .0355355 -0.61 0.542 -.0913089 .0479877 
_Iyear_1981 -.1899256 .035144 -5.40 0.000 -.2588066 -.1210445 
_Iyear_1982 -.1572512 .0353045 -4.45 0.000 -.2264468 -.0880556 
_Iyear_1983 .0102824 .0352985 0.29 0.771 -.0589014 .0794662 
_Iyear_1984 .0038489 .0351539 0.11 0.913 -.0650514 .0727492 
_Iyear_1985 .0969698 .034882 2.78 0.005 .0286024 .1653372 
_Iyear_1986 .3519338 .0349283 10.08 0.000 .2834756 .4203919 
_Iyear_1987 .3569787 .0350039 10.20 0.000 .2883723 .4255851 
_Iyear_1988 .3013595 .0348877 8.64 0.000 .2329809 .3697381 
_Iyear_1989 .5090829 .0330913 15.38 0.000 .444225 .5739407 
_Iyear_1990 .5505266 .0350518 15.71 0.000 .4818263 .6192269 
_Iyear_1991 .7079304 .0336654 21.03 0.000 .6419474 .7739133 
_Iyear_1992 .2929181 .0331631 8.83 0.000 .2279196 .3579165 
_Iyear_1993 .081891 .0340264 2.41 0.016 .0152004 .1485815 
_Iyear_1995 -.241635 .0358053 -6.75 0.000 -.311812 -.1714579 
_Iyear_1996 -.3289251 .0325573 -10.10 0.000 -.3927362 -.2651139 
_Iyear_1997 -.2922589 .0321343 -9.09 0.000 -.355241 -.2292768 
_Iyear_1998 -.0740737 .0335612 -2.21 0.027 -.1398524 -.008295 
_Iyear_1999 -.083044 .0365401 -2.27 0.023 -.1546613 -.0114268 
_Iyear_2000 -.1820988 .0337674 -5.39 0.000 -.2482818 -.1159159 
_Iyear_2001 -.1573501 .0338228 -4.65 0.000 -.2236416 -.0910586 
_Iyear_2002 -.0467489 .0337722 -1.38 0.166 -.1129413 .0194435 
_Iyear_2003 -.1583229 .0336781 -4.70 0.000 -.2243307 -.0923151 
_Iyear_2004 .0158468 .0363862 0.44 0.663 -.0554689 .0871625 
_Iyear_2005 -.2008592 .0335483 -5.99 0.000 -.2666126 -.1351057 
_Iyear_2006 -.2592007 .0326563 -7.94 0.000 -.3232059 -.1951955 
_Iyear_2007 -.0250266 .0336087 -0.74 0.456 -.0908985 .0408453 
_Iyear_2008 -.1885514 .0335774 -5.62 0.000 -.2543619 -.1227408 
_Iyear_2010 -.1120055 .0360539 -3.11 0.002 -.1826699 -.0413411 
_Iyear_2011 -.168525 .0359863 -4.68 0.000 -.2390568 -.0979932 
_cons -.5679864 .0353293 -16.08 0.000 -.6372306 -.4987423 
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Figure 1.5 Table 2 Model 4: Meso model featuring Age Segments with year dummy coefficients. 
memdic Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
AGE SEGMENT 
  40-54 
.0008568 .0071006 0.12 0.904 -.0130603 .0147738 
  25-39 -.0039152 .0071495 -0.55 0.584 -.017928 .0100975 
  15-24 .1684381 .0084481 19.94 0.000 .1518802 .184996 
COGNITIVE SKILLS 2 .115865 .0107909 10.74 0.000 .0947151 .1370149 
  3 .280695 .0104906 26.76 0.000 .2601337 .3012562 
  4 .4420316 .0112046 39.45 0.000 .420071 .4639923 
  5 .5654949 .0133311 42.42 0.000 .5393663 .5916234 
  6 .5748835 .0187158 30.72 0.000 .5382012 .6115659 
EDUCATION .2132055 .0050915 41.87 0.000 .2032264 .2231846 
PROF/EXECS .3772197 .0138417 27.25 0.000 .3500904 .4043489 
LABOR -.3223632 .0074055 -43.53 0.000 -.3368777 -.3078487 
IDEOLOGY .1449088 .0033997 42.62 0.000 .1382456 .1515721 
NET CON -.2857442 .0078323 -36.48 0.000 -.3010951 -.2703932 
EUROZONE MEMEBR .7653113 .0080225 95.40 0.000 .7495875 .781035 
FEMALE -.2596231 .0052663 -49.30 0.000 -.2699449 -.2493014 
_Iyear_1976 .1043512 .0269146 3.88 0.000 .0515994 .1571029 
_Iyear_1977 .2164503 .0270744 7.99 0.000 .1633855 .2695151 
_Iyear_1978 .2557299 .0272745 9.38 0.000 .2022729 .309187 
_Iyear_1979 .3225486 .0272185 11.85 0.000 .2692014 .3758958 
_Iyear_1980 -.0034504 .0266553 -0.13 0.897 -.0556938 .048793 
_Iyear_1981 -.1711721 .0261305 -6.55 0.000 -.222387 -.1199573 
_Iyear_1982 -.1396734 .0263456 -5.30 0.000 -.1913098 -.0880369 
_Iyear_1983 .0292952 .0263346 1.11 0.266 -.0223197 .08091 
_Iyear_1984 .0223463 .0261387 0.85 0.393 -.0288846 .0735772 
_Iyear_1985 .1158628 .0257691 4.50 0.000 .0653563 .1663694 
_Iyear_1986 .3725141 .0258325 14.42 0.000 .3218833 .4231448 
_Iyear_1987 .3752515 .0259319 14.47 0.000 .324426 .426077 
_Iyear_1988 .3195554 .0257717 12.40 0.000 .2690438 .370067 
_Iyear_1989 .5293191 .0232323 22.78 0.000 .4837846 .5748537 
_Iyear_1990 .5693593 .0259794 21.92 0.000 .5184406 .620278 
_Iyear_1991 .7289502 .0240673 30.29 0.000 .6817793 .7761212 
_Iyear_1992 .3141286 .0233241 13.47 0.000 .2684141 .359843 
_Iyear_1993 .10425 .0245717 4.24 0.000 .0560904 .1524095 
_Iyear_1994 .0232733 .0364812 0.64 0.524 -.0482285 .0947752 
_Iyear_1995 -.2181109 .0269178 -8.10 0.000 -.2708688 -.1653529 
_Iyear_1996 -.3050403 .0224509 -13.59 0.000 -.3490432 -.2610373 
_Iyear_1997 -.2676639 .0217956 -12.28 0.000 -.3103825 -.2249453 
_Iyear_1998 -.0482288 .0238776 -2.02 0.043 -.0950281 -.0014295 
_Iyear_2000 -.0998292 .0240777 -4.15 0.000 -.1470206 -.0526379 
_Iyear_2001 -.0763044 .0241291 -3.16 0.002 -.1235966 -.0290123 
_Iyear_2002 .0346022 .024057 1.44 0.150 -.0125487 .0817531 
_Iyear_2003 -.0774218 .0239606 -3.23 0.001 -.1243837 -.0304599 
_Iyear_2004 .0924622 .0276422 3.34 0.001 .0382844 .14664 
_Iyear_2005 -.1250927 .0237989 -5.26 0.000 -.1717376 -.0784478 
_Iyear_2006 -.1859659 .0225432 -8.25 0.000 -.2301498 -.1417821 
_Iyear_2007 .0471848 .0239004 1.97 0.048 .0003408 .0940288 
_Iyear_2008 -.1165847 .0238633 -4.89 0.000 -.163356 -.0698135 
_Iyear_2010 -.0449739 .0272512 -1.65 0.099 -.0983852 .0084374 
_Iyear_2011 -.102678 .0271654 -3.78 0.000 -.1559212 -.0494347 
_cons -.6065006 .0265006 -22.89 0.000 -.6584407 -.5545604 
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Figure 1.6 Table 3 Model 5: Meso model featuring Postwar Cohort & Postmaterialism, with year dummy 
coefficients. 
memdichot Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
POSTWAR COHORT -.022052 .0093354 -2.36 0.018 -.0403491 -.003755 
1932-1944 COHORT -.0019309 .0130187 -0.15 0.882 -.027447 .0235853 
POSTMATERIALISM .0735917 .006542 11.25 0.000 .0607697 .0864137 
COGNITIVE SKILLS 
2 
.0953636 .0158744 6.01 0.000 .0642504 .1264769 
  3 .2585646 .0153982 16.79 0.000 .2283848 .2887444 
  4 .3966964 .0165142 24.02 0.000 .3643292 .4290636 
  5 .4895898 .020171 24.27 0.000 .4500554 .5291242 
  6 .4644011 .0292275 15.89 0.000 .4071163 .5216858 
EDUCATION .1604836 .0079913 20.08 0.000 .144821 .1761463 
PROFESSIONAL/ 
EXECUTIVES 
.39521 .0215645 18.33 0.000 .3529445 .4374756 
LABOR -.3077909 .0111661 -27.56 0.000 -.3296762 -.2859057 
IDEOLOGY .2385866 .0053456 44.63 0.000 .2281095 .2490637 
NET CONTRIBUTOR .0433562 .0108806 3.98 0.000 .0220306 .0646818 
EUROZONE 
MEMEBR 
1.079343 .0114173 94.54 0.000 1.056966 1.101721 
FEMALE -.2342397 .0082045 -28.55 0.000 -.2503202 -.2181592 
_Iyear_1977 .1146396 .0363022 3.16 0.002 .0434886 .1857907 
_Iyear_1978 .1718805 .0365417 4.70 0.000 .10026 .243501 
_Iyear_1979 .2167846 .0419504 5.17 0.000 .1345633 .2990058 
_Iyear_1980 -.086749 .035701 -2.43 0.015 -.1567217 -.0167763 
_Iyear_1981 -.2446378 .0352163 -6.95 0.000 -.3136606 -.1756151 
_Iyear_1982 -.2188609 .0354138 -6.18 0.000 -.2882708 -.1494511 
_Iyear_1983 -.0424869 .035333 -1.20 0.229 -.1117382 .0267645 
_Iyear_1984 -.0697986 .0351589 -1.99 0.047 -.1387088 -.0008885 
_Iyear_1985 .0728788 .0339608 2.15 0.032 .0063168 .1394408 
_Iyear_1986 .3404124 .0340496 10.00 0.000 .2736764 .4071483 
_Iyear_1987 .3503479 .0341799 10.25 0.000 .2833565 .4173392 
_Iyear_1988 .2959852 .0340527 8.69 0.000 .2292431 .3627272 
_Iyear_1989 .4930458 .0321541 15.33 0.000 .4300249 .5560668 
_Iyear_1990 .5470014 .0342636 15.96 0.000 .479846 .6141567 
_Iyear_1991 .6887535 .0327699 21.02 0.000 .6245257 .7529814 
_Iyear_1992 .2987977 .0334516 8.93 0.000 .2332338 .3643615 
_Iyear_1993 .0659831 .0331428 1.99 0.046 .0010243 .1309419 
_Iyear_1997 -.3532291 .0354233 -9.97 0.000 -.4226574 -.2838008 
_Iyear_2005 -.2789143 .0351505 -7.93 0.000 -.3478081 -.2100205 
_Iyear_2008 -.2074826 .0352201 -5.89 0.000 -.2765127 -.1384525 
_cons -1.204899 .0408709 -29.48 0.000 -1.285005 -1.124794 
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Figure 1.7 Table 3 Model 6:Meso Model featuring Post 1975 Cohort & Postmaterialism with year dummy 
coefficients. 
predictors Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
POST 1975 COHORT .435307 .0457338 9.52 0.000 .3456704 .5249435 
POSTMATERIALISM .0658804 .0062716 10.50 0.000 .0535883 .0781725 
COGNITIVE SKILLS 
2 
.0959532 .0151209 6.35 0.000 .0663168 .1255896 
  3 .2543047 .0146285 17.38 0.000 .2256334 .2829761 
  4 .389522 .0156635 24.87 0.000 .3588221 .4202218 
  5 .4909981 .0193329 25.40 0.000 .4531064 .5288899 
  6 .4667502 .0282105 16.55 0.000 .4114586 .5220419 
EDUCATION .1599683 .0075603 21.16 0.000 .1451504 .1747862 
PROFESSIONAL/ 
EXECUTIVES 
.3960408 .0203576 19.45 0.000 .3561407 .4359409 
LABOR -.3088021 .0104045 -29.68 0.000 -.3291946 -.2884096 
IDEOLOGY .2455976 .005143 47.75 0.000 .2355174 .2556778 
NET CONTRIBUTOR .0796221 .0106564 7.47 0.000 .0587359 .1005083 
EUROZONE 
MEMEBR 
1.107621 .0111417 99.41 0.000 1.085783 1.129458 
FEMALE -.2322915 .0078972 -29.41 0.000 -.2477697 -.2168133 
_Iyear_1976 -.2088176 .0370879 -5.63 0.000 -.2815086 -.1361266 
_Iyear_1977 -.0980549 .0327607 -2.99 0.003 -.1622647 -.0338452 
_Iyear_1978 -.0621028 .0329331 -1.89 0.059 -.1266504 .0024448 
_Iyear_1980 -.3051387 .0323367 -9.44 0.000 -.3685175 -.24176 
_Iyear_1981 -.4571462 .0319501 -14.31 0.000 -.5197673 -.3945252 
_Iyear_1982 -.4409448 .0321257 -13.73 0.000 -.50391 -.3779796 
_Iyear_1983 -.2686163 .0320862 -8.37 0.000 -.331504 -.2057285 
_Iyear_1984 -.2758611 .0319524 -8.63 0.000 -.3384866 -.2132357 
_Iyear_1985 -.1664516 .0316691 -5.26 0.000 -.228522 -.1043813 
_Iyear_1986 .1036163 .0317605 3.26 0.001 .0413669 .1658657 
_Iyear_1987 .1141909 .031893 3.58 0.000 .0516818 .1766999 
_Iyear_1988 .0597452 .0317648 1.88 0.060 -.0025126 .1220031 
_Iyear_1989 .2578218 .0297208 8.67 0.000 .1995701 .3160735 
_Iyear_1990 .3116489 .0320108 9.74 0.000 .248909 .3743889 
_Iyear_1991 .4533494 .0303975 14.91 0.000 .3937714 .5129273 
_Iyear_1992 .0610986 .031146 1.96 0.050 .0000535 .1221436 
_Iyear_1993 -.1723617 .0308266 -5.59 0.000 -.2327806 -.1119427 
_Iyear_1997 -.5916614 .0332777 -17.78 0.000 -.6568845 -.5264382 
_Iyear_2005 -.5647649 .0335015 -16.86 0.000 -.6304267 -.4991032 
_Iyear_2008 -.4849541 .0334597 -14.49 0.000 -.5505338 -.4193743 
_cons -1.029716 .03846 -26.77 0.000 -1.105096 -.9543355 
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Figure 1.8 Table 3 Model 7: Meso model featuring Age Segments & Postmaterialism with year dummy 
coefficients. 
PREDICTORS Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
AGE SEGMENT 
  40-54 
.0031914 .0108936 0.29 0.770 -.0181597 .0245425 
25-39 -.0350479 .0108195 -3.24 0.051 -.0562537 -.0138421 
15-24 .0484902 .0124261 3.90 0.000 .0241355 .0728448 
POSTMATERIALISM .0648073 .006311 10.27 0.000 .0524379 .0771767 
COGNITIVE SKILLS 
2 
.095041 .015162 6.27 0.000 .0653241 .124758 
  3 .2538115 .0147015 17.26 0.000 .2249971 .282626 
  4 .3871689 .0158408 24.44 0.000 .3561216 .4182163 
  5 .4902638 .0194308 25.23 0.000 .4521801 .5283475 
  6 .4702256 .0282298 16.66 0.000 .4148961 .525555 
EDUCATION .1610774 .0077025 20.91 0.000 .1459808 .1761739 
PROFESSIONAL/ 
EXECUTIVES 
.4042014 .0204719 19.74 0.000 .3640773 .4443255 
LABOR -.3043019 .010701 -28.44 0.000 -.3252755 -.2833284 
IDEOLOGY .2444379 .0051589 47.38 0.000 .2343266 .2545491 
NET CONTRIBUTOR .0812384 .0106848 7.60 0.000 .0602966 .1021803 
EUROZONE 
MEMEBR 
1.107355 .0111485 99.33 0.000 1.085504 1.129206 
FEMALE -.2303741 .0079324 -29.04 0.000 -.2459213 -.2148269 
_Iyear_1976 -.2084021 .0370911 -5.62 0.000 -.2810992 -.135705 
_Iyear_1977 -.09759 .0327642 -2.98 0.003 -.1618067 -.0333733 
_Iyear_1978 -.0614124 .0329368 -1.86 0.062 -.1259673 .0031424 
_Iyear_1980 -.3046432 .0323406 -9.42 0.000 -.3680295 -.2412568 
_Iyear_1981 -.4563978 .0319534 -14.28 0.000 -.5190252 -.3937704 
_Iyear_1982 -.4401051 .0321293 -13.70 0.000 -.5030774 -.3771329 
_Iyear_1983 -.2673742 .0320905 -8.33 0.000 -.3302705 -.204478 
_Iyear_1984 -.2749851 .0319559 -8.61 0.000 -.3376176 -.2123526 
_Iyear_1985 -.1651987 .0316731 -5.22 0.000 -.2272768 -.1031205 
_Iyear_1986 .1052366 .0317654 3.31 0.001 .0429775 .1674957 
_Iyear_1987 .1147688 .0318976 3.60 0.000 .0522507 .1772868 
_Iyear_1988 .06047 .0317692 1.90 0.057 -.0017965 .1227365 
_Iyear_1989 .2587482 .0297286 8.70 0.000 .2004813 .3170151 
_Iyear_1990 .3113885 .0320203 9.72 0.000 .2486298 .3741471 
_Iyear_1991 .454035 .0304081 14.93 0.000 .3944364 .5136337 
_Iyear_1992 .0622197 .0311554 2.00 0.046 .0011563 .1232831 
_Iyear_1993 -.1707691 .0308372 -5.54 0.000 -.2312088 -.1103293 
_Iyear_1997 -.5896075 .0332951 -17.71 0.000 -.6548647 -.5243502 
_Iyear_2005 -.5137185 .0331594 -15.49 0.000 -.5787097 -.4487274 
_Iyear_2008 -.442128 .0332649 -13.29 0.000 -.5073261 -.37693 
_cons -1.031326 .0385156 -26.78 0.000 -1.106815 -.9558372 
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Figure 1.9: With Cognitive Skills separated into education & political discussion 
Predictors Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
Postmaterialism .0120896 .063323 0.19 0.851 -.1228802 .1470593 
Political Discussion .3087172 .0931914 3.31 0.005 .1100845 .50735 
Education .0712379 .0776133 0.92 0.373 -.0941909 .2366666 
Ideology .1181775 .1209503 0.98 0.344 -.1396219 .3759769 
GDP .011342 .0036429 3.11 0.007 .0035774 .0191066 
Inflation -.0002209 .0026221 -0.08 0.934 -.0058097 .005368 
Unemployment -.0067597 .0044374 -1.52 0.148 -.0162177 .0026984 
Age -.0354861 .0325971 -1.09 0.293 -.1049651 .0339929 
_cons -.5177729 .4321204 -1.20 0.249 -1.438816 .4032699 
Obs 240 
Prob > F 0.0015 
R-sq:   
within 0.3020 
between 0.0044 
overall 0.1281 
      
 
Figure 1.10: Macro Model Correlation Matrix  
                        | Support    Postmat  Cog Mobility   Ideo       GDP         Inflation     Unem.  
 
        Support    |   1.0000 
    Postmaterial |  -0.0129    1.0000 
   Cog. Mobility|   0.2576    0.6728      1.0000 
         Ideology  |  -0.2225    0.0882      0.0090          1.0000 
                 GDP |   0.2284    0.0775     -0.1406         0.0652     1.0000 
           Inflation |  -0.1016   -0.5981     -0.4059        -0.0822    -0.1910     1.0000 
Unemployment |   0.0298   -0.0832     -0.2363         -0.1926   -0.0225    -0.0846     1.0000 
 
Figure 1.11: ANOVA (Analysis of Variance Matrix) 
  Source |  Partial SS    df       MS           F     Prob > F 
   Model |  3.51579311    16  .219737069      15.61     
0.0000 
   Nation |  3.51579311    16  .219737069      15.61     
0.0000 
Residual |  4.22312084   300  .014077069    
      Total |  7.73891395   316  .024490234   
obs317  
R-squared 0.4543 
Root MSE.118647 
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Figure 1.12 Postmaterialism Means by Nation 
            |  Summary of (mean) Postmaterialism 
          Nation |        Mean        Std. Dev.       Freq. 
         France  |   1.8198878    .1031124          26 
      Belgium  |   1.7933776   .07029109         26 
Netherlands  |   1.9817783   .13002229         26 
 Germany W |   1.8545241   .15076372         26 
             Italy |   1.7208811   .11209414         26 
  Luxembour |    1.860528   .13875721          24 
      Denmark |   1.9505856   .20080532         24 
         Ireland |   1.7196516   .10134643         24 
    Great Brit |   1.8756408    .1029507          24 
  N. Ireland   |   1.7174107   .12469042         23 
         Greece |   1.6844556   .05779561         19 
            Spain |   1.7630476   .10307764        14 
       Portugal |   1.5860806   .05480226         14 
  Germany E |   1.7788349    .0645675            9 
        Finland |   1.9096227   .12790753           4 
       Sweden |    2.113268     .045202              4 
        Austria |   1.8038406   .05947238           4 
          Total |   1.8103935   .15649356         317 
 
 
Figure 1.13 Summary Statistics Postmaterialism 
          Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%     1.510204        1.47138 
 5%     1.587044        1.498328 
10%     1.624309       1.499305             Obs                 317 
25%     1.697266       1.510204              Sum of Wgt.   317 
50%     1.800805                                    Mean           1.810394 
            Percentiles      Largest               Std. Dev.      .1564936 
75%     1.896686        2.1928                Variance       .0244902 
90%     2.037717        2.19855               Skewness       .3946532 
95%     2.099059       2.211716               Kurtosis       2.720407 
99%       2.1928         2.2276        
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Figure 2.1 EB Data Pre period 
Predictors b z P>z % %StdX SDofX 
       
High Cognitive 0.07510 8.013 0.000 7.8 3.1 0.4123 
High Human Capital 0.10031 6.595 0.000 10.6 3.6 0.3551 
Professionals/Executives 0.33565 16.914 0.000 39.9 7.8 0.2251 
Labor -0.28950 -28.915 0.000 -25.1 -10.1 0.3694 
Ideology 0.55552 33.903 0.000 74.3 77.8 1.0356 
Ideology Squared -0.05497 -20.185 0.000 -5.3 -29.2 6.2838 
Net Recipient 0.29993 15.154 0.000 35.0 13.7 0.4288 
Eurozone Member 1.05655 68.501 0.000 187.6 55.2 0.4163 
Age -0.03884 -10.249 0.000 -3.8 -4.0 1.0502 
Female -0.22934 -30.624 0.000 -20.5 -10.8 0.4997 
_Ination_2 0.23104 13.106 0.000 26.0 6.1 0.2582 
_Ination_3 0.96726 53.970 0.000 163.1 34.8 0.3085 
_Ination_4 -0.11659 -7.460 0.000 -11.0 -3.4 0.2971 
_Ination_5 0.85119 48.033 0.000 134.2 27.8 0.2878 
_Ination_6 0.81042 30.036 0.000 124.9 15.2 0.1747 
_Ination_7 0.08203 5.486 0.000 8.5 2.6 0.3072 
_Ination_8 -0.28263 -13.085 0.000 -24.6 -6.9 0.2541 
_Ination_11 -0.41471 -20.055 0.000 -33.9 -10.3 0.2626 
_Ination_12 -0.04334 -1.834 0.067 -4.2 -0.9 0.2062 
_Ination_15 -1.66892 -51.669 0.000 -81.2 -16.6 0.1087 
_Ination_16 -0.75233 -29.470 0.000 -52.9 -10.4 0.1464 
_Ination_17 -0.38317 -15.346 0.000 -31.8 -5.6 0.1518 
_Iyear_1976 0.02194 0.541 0.589 2.2 0.4 0.1803 
_Iyear_1977 0.11372 2.780 0.005 12.0 2.0 0.1777 
_Iyear_1978 0.19403 4.711 0.000 21.4 3.5 0.1748 
_Iyear_1979 0.25924 6.296 0.000 29.6 4.7 0.1770 
_Iyear_1980 -0.09133 -2.255 0.024 -8.7 -1.6 0.1797 
_Iyear_1981 -0.09358 -2.122 0.034 -8.9 -1.2 0.1318 
_Iyear_1982 -0.15560 -3.876 0.000 -14.4 -2.8 0.1834 
_Iyear_1983 0.04119 1.023 0.306 4.2 0.8 0.1855 
_Iyear_1984 0.03219 0.804 0.421 3.3 0.6 0.1892 
_Iyear_1985 0.12651 3.170 0.002 13.5 2.5 0.1963 
_Iyear_1986 0.38092 9.544 0.000 46.4 8.1 0.2036 
_Iyear_1987 0.39178 9.778 0.000 48.0 8.2 0.2006 
_Iyear_1988 0.32979 8.250 0.000 39.1 6.9 0.2010 
_Iyear_1989 0.51840 13.582 0.000 67.9 15.1 0.2720 
_Iyear_1990 0.58272 14.437 0.000 79.1 12.4 0.2011 
_Iyear_1991 0.75334 19.202 0.000 112.4 19.9 0.2404 
_Iyear_1992 0.38838 10.061 0.000 47.5 10.2 0.2494 
_Iyear_1993 0.26868 6.759 0.000 30.8 5.7 0.2066 
_Iyear_1995 0.02164 0.514 0.607 2.2 0.3 0.1553 
_Iyear_1996 -0.10709 -2.813 0.005 -10.2 -2.7 0.2572 
_Iyear_1997 -0.07062 -1.881 0.060 -6.8 -2.1 0.2934 
_Iyear_1998 0.15640 3.971 0.000 16.9 3.4 0.2114 
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Figure 2.2 Post EB 
Predictors b z P>z % %StdX SDofX 
High Cognitive 0.18806 8.447 0.000 20.7 7.5 0.3867 
High Human Capital 0.42773 17.320 0.000 53.4 19.1 0.4087 
Professionals/Executives 0.34452 7.641 0.000 41.1 7.4 0.2076 
Labor -0.35462 -15.442 0.000 -29.9 -11.8 0.3529 
Ideology 0.53884 14.171 0.000 71.4 70.4 0.9894 
Ideology Squared -0.07499 -11.805 0.000 -7.2 -36.0 5.9463 
Net Recipient 1.40981 24.167 0.000 309.5 80.7 0.4195 
Eurozone Member 0.61239 16.813 0.000 84.5 32.3 0.4571 
Age -0.15704 -19.836 0.000 -14.5 -15.0 1.0334 
Female -0.31206 -18.947 0.000 -26.8 -14.4 0.5000 
_Ination_2 0.60951 13.825 0.000 84.0 15.4 0.2345 
_Ination_3 0.88991 21.147 0.000 143.5 28.1 0.2779 
_Ination_4 0.29990 7.533 0.000 35.0 8.4 0.2689 
_Ination_5 0.67926 14.366 0.000 97.2 15.9 0.2173 
_Ination_6 1.52032 23.257 0.000 357.4 31.8 0.1817 
_Ination_7 0.61110 18.692 0.000 84.2 21.6 0.3205 
_Ination_9 -0.02595 -0.723 0.469 -2.6 -0.7 0.2575 
_Ination_11 -0.85030 -14.049 0.000 -57.3 -19.0 0.2477 
_Ination_12 -0.63851 -10.269 0.000 -47.2 -14.0 0.2361 
_Ination_13 -0.75055 -12.334 0.000 -52.8 -16.5 0.2400 
_Ination_16 -0.36951 -9.950 0.000 -30.9 -10.3 0.2945 
_Iyear_2000 -0.08454 -2.904 0.004 -8.1 -3.5 0.4179 
_Iyear_2001 -0.07658 -2.634 0.008 -7.4 -3.1 0.4176 
_Iyear_2002 0.04717 1.622 0.105 4.8 2.0 0.4205 
_Iyear_2003 0.11456 2.494 0.013 12.1 2.3 0.2007 
_Iyear_2004 0.03931 1.236 0.217 4.0 1.5 0.3686 
       
 
Figure 2.3 Pre-EMU EB 
Prvalues w/ all at median 
ologit: Predictions for member 
Confidence intervals by delta method 
                                            95% Conf. Interval 
     Pr(y=bad|x):     0.1009    [ 0.0941,    0.1077] 
     Pr(y=neither|x): 0.2221   [ 0.2126,    0.2317] 
     Pr(y=good|x):    0.6770   [ 0.6608,    0.6932] 
 
      High Cog.    HHC   Professional   labor    Ideol      Ideol Squ.    Net Rec      Eurozone   Age     Female 
x=     0                   0               0                 0             3             9            0                     1             3          1 
          _Ination_2    _Ination_3    _Ination_4     _Ination_5    _Ination_6    _Ination_7    _Ination_8 
  x=               0             0                 0                    0                    0                   0                  0 
   _Ination_11   _Ination_12   _Ination_15   _Ination_16 Ination_17   _Iyear_1976   _Iyear_1977   _Iyear_1978    
x=             0             0                   0                      0             0                     0                           0               0 
     _ _Iyear_1979   _Iyear_1980   _Iyear_1981   _Iyear_1982 _Iyear_1983   _Iyear_1984 _Iyear_1985   
_Iyear_1986 
x=             0             0                    0                           0                    0                  0                         0                0 
       _Iyear_1987   _Iyear_1988   _Iyear_1989   _Iyear_1990 _Iyear_1991   _Iyear_1992   _Iyear_1993   
_Iyear_1995   
x=             0             0                        0                    0                       0                      0                       0                  0 
      _Iyear_1996   _Iyear_1997   _Iyear_1998 
x=             0             0                         0 
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Figure 2.4 Post EMU EB 
prvalue, rest(median) 
ologit: Predictions for member 
Confidence intervals by delta method 
                                 
95% Conf. Interval 
     Pr(y=bad|x):     0.1312   [ 0.1223,    0.1401] 
     Pr(y=neither|x): 0.2794   [ 0.2692,    0.2895] 
     Pr(y=good|x):    0.5894   [ 0.5710,    0.6078] 
 
         High Cog.   HC    professional   labor       ideol    ideolsqu    netrec eurozone 
x=             0             0             0             0             3             9              0         1 
                  age           sex    _Ination_2    _Ination_3    _Ination_4    _Ination_5    _Ination_6 
x=               3             1             0                    0                     0                0                     0 
      _Ination_7    _Ination_9   _Ination_11   _Ination_12   _Ination_13   _Ination_16   _Iyear_2000   
_Iyear_2001 
x=             0             0                   0             0             0             0                         0             0                    0  
     _Iyear_2002   _Iyear_2003   _Iyear_2004 
x=             0                  0                     0 
 
Figure 2.4 EVS Pre-EMU 
Predictors b z P>z % %StdX SDofX 
       
Postmaterialist -0.02706 -0.787 0.431 -2.7 -1.1 0.4133 
High 
Cognitive 
0.18339 5.188 0.000 20.1 7.9 0.4139 
High Human 
Capital 
0.32002 6.916 0.000 37.7 10.9 0.3238 
Professional -0.05931 -1.088 0.277 -5.8 -1.6 0.2785 
Labor -0.09175 -3.026 0.002 -8.8 -4.3 0.4822 
Net Recipient -1.37724 -12.838 0.000 -74.8 -44.1 0.4227 
Eurozone 0.47912 6.785 0.000 61.5 18.2 0.3490 
Age -0.02965 -2.099 0.036 -2.9 -2.9 0.9937 
Female -0.06009 -2.135 0.033 -5.8 -3.0 0.4993 
_Ination2_2 -0.00358 -0.056 0.955 -0.4 -0.1 0.3221 
_Ination2_3 -0.53275 -7.048 0.000 -41.3 -11.7 0.2328 
_Ination2_4 -0.28698 -4.756 0.000 -24.9 -10.4 0.3844 
_Ination2_5 0.66801 9.630 0.000 95.0 21.9 0.2961 
_Ination2_6 -0.05454 -0.433 0.665 -5.3 -0.6 0.1164 
_Ination2_7 -0.64246 -8.626 0.000 -47.4 -14.9 0.2515 
_Ination2_8 1.76694 16.010 0.000 485.3 53.4 0.2421 
_Ination2_12 1.24573 11.709 0.000 247.5 40.2 0.2713 
_Ination2_13 1.49256 13.673 0.000 344.8 44.4 0.2462 
_Ination2_15 -0.65622 -7.680 0.000 -48.1 -12.0 0.1940 
_Ination2_18 -0.80482 -9.887 0.000 -55.3 -15.6 0.2110 
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Figure 2.5 EVS Post EMU 
Predictors b z P>z % %StdX SDofX 
Postmaterialist 0.02871 0.605 0.545 2.9 1.1 0.3738 
High 
Cognitive 
0.23803 5.439 0.000 26.9 10.4 0.4145 
High Human 
Capital 
0.41321 8.114 0.000 51.2 16.3 0.3662 
Professional 0.27169 5.273 0.000 31.2 10.3 0.3603 
Labor -0.30525 -4.719 0.000 -26.3 -8.3 0.2831 
Net Recipient 0.28876 2.493 0.013 33.5 11.8 0.3867 
Eurozone 0.42842 4.928 0.000 53.5 14.5 0.3164 
Age -0.06250 -3.320 0.001 -6.1 -5.7 0.9347 
Female -0.01895 -0.537 0.591 -1.9 -0.9 0.5000 
_Ination2_2 0.39707 4.800 0.000 48.7 11.5 0.2744 
_Ination2_3 -0.38079 -4.597 0.000 -31.7 -9.8 0.2712 
_Ination2_4 -0.67725 -8.459 0.000 -49.2 -18.3 0.2993 
_Ination2_5 0.70473 7.092 0.000 102.3 16.3 0.2148 
_Ination2_6 0.57277 6.519 0.000 77.3 15.7 0.2546 
_Ination2_11 -0.36558 -3.039 0.002 -30.6 -8.6 0.2473 
_Ination2_12 -0.07515 -0.593 0.553 -7.2 -1.6 0.2135 
_Ination2_13 0.38445 2.897 0.004 46.9 8.0 0.1994 
_Ination2_15 -0.42579 -4.860 0.000 -34.7 -9.9 0.2461 
_Ination2_16 -0.80436 -9.930 0.000 -55.3 -21.4 0.2997 
_Ination2_17 -0.06937 -0.665 0.506 -6.7 -1.4 0.2084 
_Ination2_18 -0.95771 -10.757 0.000 -61.6 -22.1 0.2603 
 
Figure 2.6 Pre EMU prvalue, rest(median) 
logit: Predictions for conf 
Confidence intervals by delta method                              
                                           95% Conf. Interval 
  Pr(y=1|x):          0.5752   [ 0.5496,    0.6009] 
  Pr(y=0|x):          0.4248   [ 0.3991,    0.4504] 
 
       Postmaterialist       High Cog.        HHC   Professional        Labor  Net Rec.    Eurozone   Age    Female 
x=             0                      0                   0             0                      0             0             1                3           1 
            _Ination2_2   _Ination2_3   _Ination2_4   _Ination2_5   _Ination2_6   _Ination2_7   _Ination2_8 
x=            0                     0                       0                    0                       0                     0                  0 
    _Ination2_12  _Ination2_13  _Ination2_15  _Ination2_18 
x=             0                  0                    0                      0 
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Figure 2.7 Post EMU prvalue, rest(median) 
logit: Predictions for Integration Support 
Confidence intervals by delta method                         
                                            95% Conf. Interval 
  Pr(y=1|x):          0.4832   [ 0.4528,    0.5136] 
  Pr(y=0|x):          0.5168   [ 0.4864,    0.5472] 
 
    Postmaterialist       High Cog.        HHC   Professional        Labor          Net Rec.    Eurozone   Age      Female 
x=             0                        0               0                 0                     0                    0                1             3               1                       
_Ination2_2   _Ination2_3   _Ination2_4     _Ination2_5   _Ination2_6  _Ination2_11  _Ination2_12  
_Ination2_13   
x=          0               0                      0                       0             0                      0                        0                       0                               
_Ination2_15  _Ination2_16  _Ination2_17_Ination2_18  
x=        0              0                     0                        0 
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